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INTRODUCTION 
On June 2, 2003, the Federal Communications Commission (the 
“FCC” or “Commission”) handed down a decision to relax its 
broadcast ownership rules in a 3-2 vote along party lines.1  This 
rulemaking will likely be remembered as among the most 
controversial in Commission history.2  Perhaps the most contentious 
rule approved in this vote was a ten percent increase in the national 
ownership cap of broadcast stations.3  Under this new limit, a 
company may own television stations that, in the aggregate, reach up 
to forty-five percent of the country’s television households.4  
Concerned about the public outcry against the new broadcast rules 
and subsequent litigation efforts to put a stop to their 
implementation, Congress passed a new, thirty-nine percent national 
ownership limit within its next Appropriations Act.5  On January 22, 
2004, President George W. Bush signed this bill into law.6 
                                                          
 1. See Frank Ahrens, FCC Eases Media Ownership Rules, WASH. POST, June 3, 2003, 
at A1 (reporting that the new broadcast rules were contentious, and support for 
them was split along party lines, with the Republicans following the lead of Chairman 
Michael Powell). 
 2. See Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Media Concentration Bench Remarks 
(June 2, 2003), at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
235047A5.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that the 
Commission received over three quarters of a million comments on its proposed 
broadcast rules in advance of the June 2, 2003 vote, more than for any other 
proceeding in Commission history).  The Commissioner further discusses the many 
public hearings he attended across the country, along with Commissioner Adelstein, 
in which Americans from across the political spectrum were opposed to the 
proposed broadcast rules. 
 3. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman, A Sure-fire Recipe for Trouble, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., June 23, 2003, at 52 (warning the public about the unprecedented media 
consolidation that will result from lifting the ownership cap from thirty-five percent 
to forty-five percent); COMMUNICATIONS DAILY (Warren Communications News, 
Wash., D.C.), June 3, 2003, at 1 (noting that the opposition to changes in the 
broadcast ownership rules by various organizations and Congress focused primarily 
on the increased ownership cap). 
 4. Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and 
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and 
Definition of Radio Markets, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286, 46,327-28 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be 
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership 
Rules]. 
 5. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, 118 Stat. 3 
(amending the 1996 Telecommunications Act by striking “thirty-five percent” and 
replacing it with “thirty-nine percent”). 
 6. See Additional Comment Sought on UHF Television Discount, 69 Fed. Reg. 
9216, 9216 (Feb. 27, 2004) [hereinafter 2004 UHF Discount Comment Request] 
(detailing the steps taken to change the national ownership cap to thirty-nine 
percent and calling for comments on eliminating the UHF discount).  The passage 
of the Appropriations Act raising the ownership cap to thirty-nine percent prompted 
the Commission to reconsider maintaining the UHF discount, and the agency has 
taken comments on whether or not to keep this rule.  Id.  However, the Commission 
is considering only whether or not the language of the Appropriations Act signifies 
“approval, adoption, or ratification” of the UHF discount.  Id. 
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The FCC calculates national ownership for broadcast companies by 
counting the number of households that receive a particular station 
against the number of households that receive television nationwide.7  
In this calculation, the FCC takes into account whether a station is on 
the Very-High Frequency (“VHF”) band, 86-408 MHz (channels 2-
13), or the Ultra-High Frequency (“UHF”) band, 480-920 MHz 
(channels 14-83).8  The Commission considers this frequency 
distinction pursuant to a provision called the UHF discount.9  The 
UHF discount requires the FCC to attribute a UHF station with fifty 
percent of the nationwide reach of a VHF station when calculating a 
broadcast owner’s national ownership percentage.10  The Commission 
created the UHF discount provision in the 1980s to help struggling 
stations on the UHF band.11 
Over the past eighteen years, the Commission has transformed 
UHF television into a success story with regulatory assistance 
measures like the UHF discount.12  Over the same period of time, 
                                                          
 7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2)(i) (2003) (defining national audience reach as 
“the total number of television households in the Nielsen Designated Market Areas 
(DMAs) in which the relevant stations are located divided by the total national 
television households as measured by DMA data at the time of a grant, transfer, or 
assignment of a license”). 
 8. Id. (explaining that for purposes of making a national ownership calculation, 
“UHF television stations shall be attributed with 50 percent of the television 
households in their DMA market”).  See generally The Darkened Channels:  UHF 
Television and the FCC, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1578, 1578-79 (1962) (examining the 
thirteen-year history of the Commission’s system of channel allocation). 
 9. See In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555 [formerly Sections 73.35, 
73.240 and 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of 
AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum, Opinion, and Order, 100 
F.C.C.2d 74, ¶ 42 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order]; 
Mark K. Miller & Dan Trigoboff, Calm Before the Storm, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr. 7, 
2003, at http://www.broadcastingcable.com (on file with the American University 
Law Review) (explaining that the FCC method for calculating reach assumes that 
VHF stations (channels 2-13) reach every home in the market, but UHF stations 
(channels 14-83) reach only half as many homes).  The article further notes that the 
FCC does not count the reach of any group’s second stations in a market when 
calculating national ownership levels.  Id. 
 10. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(2)(i); see Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (noting that 
the FCC calculates national ownership by assessing the percentage of the 106.7 
million homes with television sets that each broadcast company reaches with their 
various stations). 
 11. The Commission created the UHF discount of the National Broadcast 
Ownership Rule as a revision of a 1984 rulemaking on media ownership issues.  1985 
Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶¶ 1-44.  The UHF discount was 
a direct response to various petitions sent to the Commission during the rulemaking 
arguing that the FCC should give UHF stations special treatment that would account 
for the technical handicap between the signals and create incentives for companies 
and networks to purchase them.  Id.  For a more detailed discussion on the history of 
the UHF discount, see infra Part II.C. 
 12. See In the Matter of Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing 
Television Broadcasting, Report and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 4538, ¶¶ 18-24 (1995) 
[hereinafter 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order] (finding that, in 1995, there 
ROTHENBERGER.AUTHORCHANGES2.FINAL.DOC 4/30/2004  2:39 PM 
692 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:689 
however, technological advancements, the evolution of viewer 
behavior, and market realities have created a world in which the 
UHF/VHF distinction no longer exists.13  In fact, the Commission 
itself has gathered sufficient findings showing the robust health of 
UHF television to eliminate every other regulatory assistance measure 
supporting UHF.14  Keeping the UHF discount in the face of these 
findings contravenes a clear congressional mandate to eliminate 
broadcast rules that are no longer necessary in the public interest as a 
result of competition.15 
Today, the UHF discount is anathema to a healthy media 
marketplace because it effectively raises the national ownership limit 
for companies choosing to acquire UHF television stations.16  This 
provision encourages greater media concentration by authorizing 
some of the largest media companies to exceed the national 
ownership limits imposed by the Commission.17  This kind of 
                                                          
were more UHF television stations than VHF stations, and that the band grew by 
235% between 1971 and 1994). 
 13. See infra Part III.A (discussing the technological improvements to UHF 
television). 
 14. See infra Part III.B (discussing the analytical inconsistency of the 
Commission’s decisions to repeal all regulatory measures assisting UHF television 
except for the UHF discount).  See, e.g., In the Matter of Policies Regarding 
Detrimental Effects of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, Report 
and Order, 3 F.C.C.R. 638, ¶¶ 1-26, 31 (1998) [hereinafter 1988 Detrimental Effects 
Order] (eliminating the UHF Impact Policy and finding that UHF service had 
achieved enough comparability with the VHF service so as to repeal this assistance 
measure for fear that it may harm VHF stations if continued); In re Review of the 
Prime Time Access Rule, Section 73.658(k) of the Commission’s Rules, MM Docket 
No. 94-123, 11 F.C.C.R. 546, ¶¶ 1-4, 64-86 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 PTAR Order] 
(repealing the Prime Time Access Rule (“PTAR”), reasoning that UHF television had 
become so viable that is was attracting network affiliation on its own, and no longer 
required this regulatory assistance measure); 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, 
supra note 12, ¶ 4 (repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule based on the technical 
advancements to UHF television and the Commission’s findings that these stations 
had become financially successful). 
 15. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 
111-12 (2003).  Legislative history and the courts have interpreted Section 202(h) as 
carrying with it a presumption toward changing rules biennially.  See, e.g., Fox 
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1035-46 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Sinclair 
Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  The Commission has also 
acknowledged this presumption toward change.  2002 Biennial Broadcast Review 
Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287 (acknowledging the decisions in Fox 
Television and Sinclair in which the court found this presumption toward change).  
Furthermore, Congress has directed the Commission to issue a report including “full 
justification” for retaining any broadcast rules under its biennial review.  See H.R. 
CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148 (1999).  The Commission failed to do this when it 
most recently chose to maintain the UHF discount.  2002 Biennial Broadcast Review 
Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,328. 
 16. See infra Part III.C (discussing media concentration, the UHF discount, and 
how this provision further discourages smaller competitors from entering the 
broadcast market). 
 17. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (stating that the UHF discount allows a 
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concentration poses a direct threat to the basic public interest tenets 
of American broadcast regulation; competition, localism, and 
diversity.18 
This Comment argues that the Commission should eliminate or 
promptly phase out the UHF discount because it is contrary to the 
public interest.  Part I describes the role of the public interest in 
communication law and especially in broadcast.  Part II outlines the 
history of UHF stations and their role in the television broadcast 
industry.  It also discusses the FCC and its efforts to foster the growth 
of UHF.  Part III argues that advances in technology and changes in 
both viewer behavior and market realities have bridged the gap 
between UHF and VHF.  Next, Part III highlights a line of FCC 
decisions repealing every other regulatory measure created to assist 
UHF based on findings showing the viability of UHF television.  This 
Section argues that it is inconsistent to maintain the UHF discount in 
light of these findings.  Finally, Part III asserts that the UHF discount 
encourages media concentration and argues that this phenomenon 
harms the public interest in broadcast.  This Section also proposes 
some practical solutions for eliminating the UHF discount.   
I. THE FCC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
The FCC’s obligation to act in the public interest dates back 
further than the Commission itself.  The Federal Radio Act of 1927 
was passed under the premise that the right of the public to receive 
communications services is superior to the right of any individual.19  
The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal 
Communications Commission and authorized it to grant licenses that 
                                                          
company to own two UHF stations for every one VHF station under the national 
ownership limits).  The clearest way to understand the effect of this rule is to 
calculate national ownership for the top media companies without the discount.  Id.  
Thus, Paxson would reach 61.8% of U.S. homes, Viacom 44.8%, Fox 44.4%, 
Univision 41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%, thereby allowing six of the top 
media markets to operate above the thirty-five percent national ownership limits.  Id. 
 18. See infra Part III.C.  See generally Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202 
(amending broadcast regulations while maintaining the public interest standard); 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307-308 (2003) (giving the 
Commission broad authority to make rules and grant licenses that serve the public 
interest, convenience, and necessity). 
 19. Radio Act of 1927 § 4, 69 Pub. L. No, 632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927) 
(establishing the Federal Radio Commission, which allocates frequencies among 
applicants in a manner responsive to “public convenience, interest, or necessity”); see 
also 67 CONG. REC. 5479 (1926) (statement of Sen. White) (asserting that the Radio 
Act of 1927 provides a fundamental shift in communications law from allowing 
anyone to “transmit what they will” to the doctrine that “the right of the public 
interest to service is superior to the right of any individual”). 
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serve the “public interest, convenience, and necessity.”20  In addition, 
Section 303(r) of the Communications Act provides that: 
The Commission from time to time, as public convenience, 
interest, or necessity requires, shall . . . [make] such rules and 
regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not 
inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the 
provisions of [the Act].21 
The Commission has broad authority to regulate the broadcast 
industry according to this standard.22  The FCC has long interpreted 
the public interest in broadcast to be that which fosters diversity, 
localism, and competition on the airwaves.23  The primary theory 
underlying the Commission’s emphasis on diversity is that having the 
greatest possible number of owners in the mass media market 
promotes a variety of viewpoints and prevents the undue 
concentration of economic power.24  Localism is a longstanding 
                                                          
 20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307-308; see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 
U.S. 775, 795 (1978) (“[The] avowed claim of the Communications Act of 1934 was 
to secure the maximum benefits of radio to all the people of the United States.”) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 21. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r). 
 22. See id. § 151 (stating the purpose of the Federal Communications 
Commission); id. § 303 (granting the Commission broad authority to regulate the 
broadcast industry according to the public interest, convenience, and necessity); id. § 
301 (authorizing the Commission to grant and revoke licenses in broadcast 
according to the public interest, convenience, and necessity). 
 23. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287-
88 (identifying diversity, competition, and localism as longstanding goals that would 
continue to be core agency objectives in broadcast).  The Commission’s commitment 
to localism, diversity, and competition were evident long before these principals were 
articulated in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 or the 2003 Broadcast 
Rulemaking.  See In the Matter of Petition for Rulemaking to Amend Television 
Tables of Assignments and to Add New VHF Stations in the Top 100 Markets and to 
Assure that the New Stations Maximize Diversity of Ownership, Control, and 
Programming, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 63 F.C.C.2d 840, ¶¶ 21-24 (1977) 
[hereinafter 1977 Television Assignment Order] (revealing that the Commission 
allocated the first intermixed set of television stations according to five priorities 
demonstrating its desire to provide nationwide access to television, as well as 
competition and a diversity of viewpoints wherever possible); see also Nat’l Citizens 
Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. at 781 (explaining that the FCC has considered a diversity 
in control of the media as “‘a factor of primary significance’” in determining who 
should receive the initial license for a broadcast facility among competing applicants 
in a comparative proceeding); ROGER G. NOLL ET AL., ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF 
TELEVISION REGULATION 100-04 (1973) (illustrating that the Commission’s 
commitment to localism in television was most clearly demonstrated through its 
decision to use the still-experimental UHF band to expand television service).  Noll 
also cites the role of the localism doctrine in regulations governing group ownership 
and cross-media ownership.  Id. at 104-08.  Noll suggests that the Commission chose 
to increase the number of television stations by using the UHF band because these 
stations and their lower-powered signals would remain local.  Id. at 101-04. 
 24. See In the Matter of 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,751, 65,756 (Oct. 28, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Biennial 
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objective for broadcast, and is based on the Commission’s vision for 
television in which station owners, who are part of the community, 
serve their audiences with original content, produced by and for the 
community.25  The third broadcast tenet has its roots in the principal 
that greater competition among television owners will produce better 
service for consumers.  This became a major goal for the Commission 
through the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.26 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 modernized the 1934 
Communications Act by taking into account changes in technology 
and the dramatic increase in the variety of media sources.27  With 
passage of this law, Congress lifted the national ownership cap and 
eased other media cross-ownership restrictions.28  Nevertheless, the 
                                                          
Broadcast Review NPRM] (“The Commission has considered four aspects of diversity:  
viewpoint diversity, outlet diversity, source diversity, and program diversity.”); see also 
Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (asserting that 
greater diversity eliminates the ability of one person or group to exert “an inordinate 
effect, in political, editorial, or similar programming sense, [or] on public opinion at 
the regional level”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 25. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760 (“[A] 
primary objective and benefit of our nation’s system of regulation of broadcast 
television is the local origination of programming.”) (quoting congressional findings 
and policy pursuant to the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition 
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460, which would require cable operators 
to carry no less than a fixed number of local television stations in each market).  For 
a detailed discussion of localism, see infra Part III.C. 
 26. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,291 
(noting the Commission’s duty, from the Communications Act of 1934, to serve the 
public interest by ensuring open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities); 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (2003) 
(mandating that the Commission review its rules biennially and determine whether 
any of such rules are “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition”).  
Competition became of primary importance under the 1996 Act because its focus 
was largely on deregulation.  Id.  The Act raised the national ownership limit to 
thirty-five percent and forced the Commission to reevaluate its rules biennially to 
foster competition.  Id. 
 27. See Telecommunications Act of 1996 (adding provisions for the regulation of 
new technology and relaxing media ownership restrictions).  While the 1996 Act was 
conceived to deregulate telecommunications markets to a large extent, it does not 
lose sight of the Commission’s duty to regulate communications services in the 
public interest.  See S. REP. NO. 104-23, at 16 (1995) (“[T]he purpose for the bill is to 
increase competition in all telecommunications markets and provide for an orderly 
transition from regulated markets to competitive and deregulated 
telecommunications markets consistent with the public interest, convenience, and 
necessity.”); see also Judith C. Aarons, Note, Cross-Ownership’s Last Stand? The Federal 
Communications Commission’s Proposal Concerning the Repeal of the Newspaper/Broadcast 
Cross-Ownership Rule, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 317, 329-30 (2002) 
(stating that the new Act aimed to increase competition and encourage deregulation 
based on changes in technology and new media sources). 
 28. See Telecommunications Act § 202(h) (authorizing the FCC to eliminate the 
cap on the number of television stations any one entity may own, while increasing 
the national ownership cap to thirty-five percent from twenty-five percent).  The Act 
also repealed the telephone/cable and cable/broadcast cross-ownership rules, lifted 
remaining limits on cable/network cross-ownership, eliminated national and local 
caps on radio ownership, and eased the dual-network rule.  Id. 
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1996 Telecommunications Act maintained the public interest focus 
of the 1934 Act by stating that “the Commission shall seek to promote 
the policies and purposes of this Act favoring diversity of media 
voices, vigorous economic competition, technical advancement and 
the promotion of the public interest, convenience and necessity.”29  
Thus, Congress mandated that the Commission continue to regulate 
broadcast television according to the same principals that guided it at 
its inception, despite the overwhelming growth in the number and 
types of media in this country over the past eighty years.30 
II. UHF TELEVISION:  THE LONG ROAD TO SUCCESS 
A. The History of UHF 
In 1945, the FCC began allocating television stations to the 
country’s 140 largest markets, using channels on the VHF band.31  By 
1948, the television phenomenon had reached a competitive high 
point, and the VHF band was saturated.32  Across the country, stations 
were suffering from overwhelming interference problems from this 
surge in station assignments.33  The allotment of VHF stations had 
run its course, and there were no channels left for television 
stations.34  The FCC subsequently put all pending applications for 
new television licenses on hold in a four-year “television freeze” while 
it searched for a solution to these problems.35  The public wanted 
                                                          
 29. Id. § 257(b). 
 30. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(“In the context of the regulation of broadcasting, the ‘public interest’ has 
historically embraced diversity (as well as localism) . . . and nothing in § 202(h) 
signals a departure from that historic scope.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 31. See The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1 (explaining that the FCC 
distributed the broadcast licenses in order to foster fair and efficient television 
service). 
 32. See CHRISTOPHER H. STERLING & JOHN M. KITTROSS, STAY TUNED:  A CONCISE 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 295-99 (1978) (describing how the popularity of 
television transformed itself into a nationwide phenomenon); HUGH R. SLOTTEN, 
RADIO AND TELEVISION REGULATION:  BROADCASTING TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1920-1960 166 (2000) (recounting that manufacturers had been able to sell 
only 14,000 television sets in 1947, but sold 172,000 the very next year). 
 33. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 295 (stating that by 1948, the 
Commission was fighting a losing battle by trying to provide each community with 
their own television stations on the VHF band).  Mutual interference between station 
signals in neighboring cities, such as Detroit and Cleveland, was making reception 
impossible in each.  Id. 
 34. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 21-24 (noting that 
the Commission froze the applications for television stations while it looked for a 
solution to interference problems on the VHF band). 
 35. Id.; see also STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 295-96 (reporting that 
several hearings took place during the time of the “freeze” involving five main 
television issues:  “(1) color television standards, (2) reduction of tropospeheric 
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more options on television, and the Commission was tasked with 
providing an environment where competition, localism, and diversity 
could flourish.36  Ultimately, after much debate, the Commission 
chose to create more stations by using the still-experimental UHF 
band.37  This expansion allowed more spacing between stations on 
the VHF band, and therefore less interference, while giving viewers 
more options on television.38  Adding UHF stations to the broadcast 
lineup provided more communities with their own stations, satisfying 
the Commission’s tripartite goal of encouraging competition, 
localism, and diversity.39  
In 1952, with the Sixth Report and Order on this matter, the FCC 
lifted the “television freeze” order and proceeded to allocate seventy 
                                                          
interference, (3) possible spectrum locations for additional channels, (4) city-by-city 
assignment of channels and criteria for these assignments, and (5) educational 
television channel reservations”). 
 36. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 299 (noting that finding more 
channels for the television industry was the only way the Commission could provide 
for a competitive nationwide television system).  When the Commission finally 
created more television stations in 1952, its allocation decisions were based on five 
priorities that underscored the Commission’s concern with distributing television 
stations widely to create nationwide access and its attempt to provide the most 
diverse, competitive environment possible. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, 
supra note 23, ¶ 24.  The priorities were, first, “to provide at least one television 
service to all parts of the United States”; second, “to provide each community with at 
least one television station”; third, “to provide a choice of at least two television 
services to all parts of the United States”; fourth, “to provide each community with at 
least two television stations”; and fifth, “any channels remaining unassigned under 
these priorities would be assigned . . . on the basis of the size of the population of the 
city, geographic location, and the number of TV services available from stations in 
other communities.”  Id. ¶ 25. 
 37. See generally id. ¶¶ 23-25 (reciting history of UHF television); Notice of 
Inquiry, In the Matter of Improvements to UHF Television Reception, 70 F.C.C.2d 
1162, ¶¶ 5-7 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI] 
(discussing long-term struggles facing UHF television in its earliest years); NOLL ET 
AL., supra note 23, at 100-04 (explaining the various failures of the UHF band when it 
began in 1954). 
 38. One proposed allocation plan at this time involved sacrificing some local 
stations to build regional stations that would carry network programming.  The 
Commission rejected this plan in favor of finding ways to create as many local 
television stations as possible, and hence, eventually decided to explore the use of 
the UHF band rather than creating a fourth network.  See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, 
at 101 (stating that one proposed allocation plan at this time involved sacrificing 
some local stations to build regional stations that would carry network 
programming). 
 39. See id. at 5 (explaining the Commission’s view that “as many communities as 
possible should have the opportunity [to enjoy] the advantages that derive from 
having local outlets that will be responsive to local needs”) (citing Sixth Report and 
Order, In the Matters of Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commissions’ Rules 
and Regulations; Amendment of the Commission’s Rules, Regulations and 
Engineering Standards Concerning the Television Broadcast Service, Utilization of 
Frequencies in the Band 470 to 890 Mcs. for Television Broadcasting, 41 F.C.C. 148, 
¶ 79 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 Sixth Report and Order]). 
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UHF channels to broadcast television.40  Initially, this solution had few 
allies.41  The primary criticism of using UHF to create more television 
stations was that its signal had substantial technical limitations.42  For 
example, a typical VHF station provides reliable reception in an area 
up to sixty-five to seventy miles, while UHF stations, at that time, 
reached only thirty to forty miles.43  A new UHF station also faced the 
obstacle of American households, the vast majority of which had 
television sets capable of receiving only the VHF signal.44 
Another major criticism of the Sixth Report and Order was the 
Commission’s plan to “intermix” both VHF and UHF stations in the 
same markets.45  Instead of allowing stations within a community to 
                                                          
 40. 1952 Sixth Report and Order, supra note 39, ¶ 79 (revising the 1948 “freeze 
order,” which provided that “no new or pending applications for the construction of 
new television broadcast stations would be acted upon by the Commission”); see also 
1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶ 24 (noting that the Sixth Report 
and Order of 1952 established the television system in place today, which began with 
twelve VHF and seventy UHF channels); The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1579 
(remarking that “[o]ver two thousand channel assignments were reserved for more 
than 1200 communities; [and that] 252 channels were reserved for educational 
use”).  In total, the allocated UHF channels, 14-83, provided 1,433 additional station 
assignments.  NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 4 (highlighting alterations that were 
made to this allocation plan in 1966). 
 41. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 299 (reporting that “even those in 
favor of greater access were not in favor of starting the untried UHF band”). 
 42. See generally In the Matter of Improvements to UHF Television Reception, 
Report and Order, 90 F.C.C.2d 1121, ¶¶ 1-5, 20-27 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 UHF 
Development Policy Order] (reporting that the UHF signal has historically suffered 
from particular challenges, such as a weaker signal, poor signal and picture 
reception, and much higher operating costs than VHF stations because of the higher 
power levels that UHF requires).  The Report also states findings from the efforts by 
the FCC to aid UHF stations and foster their growth.  Id.  See generally BRUCE M. OWEN 
ET AL., TELEVISION ECONOMICS 122 (1984) (citing tuning difficulties and technical 
limitations as two major obstacles to the success of UHF televisions stations). 
 43. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 324 (stating that a lower-frequency 
station, and thus a lower-numbered channel, provides better service than a higher-
numbered channel because the signal of the lower-frequency will travel further). 
 44. See id. at 299 (citing receiver conversion problems as the primary technical 
obstacle facing potential UHF stations at that time); NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 
102 (stating that UHF tuning was more difficult because it had poorer signals as 
compared with VHF stations). 
 45. The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1579-80 (reporting strong opposition 
to intermixture by CBS and DuMont networks, as well as television manufacturers).  
The Commission initially chose to intermix UHF and VHF television in every market 
for two reasons:  an all VHF market might restrict service in larger cities because of 
interference problems on the VHF band, while all-UHF communities would be 
deprived of the wider-reaching VHF service.  See In The Matter of Table of Television 
Allotments, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 F.C.C.2d 51, ¶ 22 (1980) 
[hereinafter 1980 TV Allotments NPRM].  It is interesting to note that the 
President’s Communications Policy Board Report of 1961 warned that intermixture 
would likely harm UHF stations for a considerable period of time because the 
technical differences of these two signals meant that UHF stations could not be 
comparable to VHF stations.  STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 302-03. This 
report also acknowledged the early-comer status of VHF stations would mean that 
audiences would be unlikely to purchase additional receivers just to watch the newer 
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compete with others on the same frequency band, critics argued, the 
Commission sabotaged UHF stations by forcing them to compete 
with stations on the technically superior VHF band.46  DuMont, the 
fourth major network at the time, set forth the following arguments 
against intermixture: 
(1) UHF transmitting equipment was inferior to available VHF 
equipment in power and efficiency; 
(2) large established VHF audiences would be withheld from UHF 
stations because of the need to buy adapters and in many cases to 
erect new receiving antennas for UHF; 
(3) UHF was not received as well in built-up or rough-terrain areas; 
(4) in large metropolitan markets, advertisers would prefer VHF 
stations with established receiver audiences and would prefer 
networks with VHF affiliates.47 
Nevertheless, the FCC chose to support the “fiction of equivalence” 
of VHF and UHF.48  They believed both that technology would 
improve and that viewer behavior would easily change.49  It did not 
take long for the critics to prove UHF proponents wrong.  Almost as 
soon as UHF stations began airing, most went dark.50  In 1954, there 
were 121 UHF stations, over one-third of the total television stations 
on the air.51  By 1960, forty-six of these had gone off the air.52  All told, 
                                                          
UHF stations.  Id. 
 46. See 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37, ¶ 7 (explaining 
that when UHF television began in 1952, it was competing with 108 well-established 
VHF stations, reaching two-thirds of nationwide households, as well as a majority of 
homes equipped with television sets that received only VHF television); see also 
STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 302-03 (illustrating how the critics’ 
predictions came true, with hundreds of UHF stations shutting down due to their 
inability to compete with the superior VHF stations). 
 47. The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1580 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 303. 
 49. 1952 Sixth Report and Order, supra note 39, ¶ 197. 
 [W]e are convinced that the UHF band will be fully utilized and that UHF 
stations will eventually compete on a favorable basis with stations in the 
VHF . . . .  We are persuaded that the differences in propagation 
characteristics will not prevent UHF stations from becoming an integral part 
of a single service . . . .  Further, there is no reason to believe that American 
science will not produce the equipment necessary for the fullest 
development of UHF. 
Id. 
 50. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 356.  Those who argued that 
intermixture would destroy UHF stations were proven right almost as soon as these 
stations went on the air.  Despite the Commission’s attempt to bring in viable 
competition to VHF stations, the intermixture plan created undeniable inequalities 
because of the status of the technology and viewer behavior at that time.  See id. 
(stating that the large amount of VHF-only televisions put UHF at a serious 
disadvantage). 
 51. Id. at 102. 
 52. Id. 
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nearly fifty-five percent of the 165 stations that went on the air 
between 1952 and 1959 eventually failed.53  UHF operators were 
battling all of the initial technical inequalities and discovering new 
difficulties along the way.54 
Audiences were reluctant to start watching the new UHF stations, 
partly due to custom and partly because they found the quality of 
programming poor compared to the already-established VHF 
stations.55  Television manufacturers were slow to produce UHF-VHF 
compatible sets, and they justified their foot-dragging by citing 
negligible demand for such sets, despite the fact that they had 
pledged to manufacture them.56  Also, in an attempt to encourage 
localism, the FCC only authorized UHF stations to operate with 
enough power to serve small areas.57  Regardless of this restriction, 
the technical limitations of the UHF signal, coupled with the 
inferiority of early transmitters and receivers, meant that it was 
difficult to receive a good UHF picture more than a few miles away 
from the transmitter.58  This was true even if UHF stations were 
allowed to use several times more power than a VHF station.59  
Advertisers were turned off by UHF stations’ small audiences, and 
many UHF station owners could not find a way to earn back the 
hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars they spent launching 
their new stations.60  In addition, few networks were interested in 
                                                          
 53. See id. at 357 (citing these figures as evidence of the seriousness of the plight 
of UHF stations and noting that the FCC’s first priority was to meet the needs of the 
television-hungry public by processing station applications). 
 54. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 25 (explaining the 
Commission’s assessment of the factors hindering UHF television in 1956, including 
the abundance of VHF-only television sets in homes; the performance deficiencies of 
UHF transmitters and receivers; and the resulting preference of program and 
money-making sources for VHF stations).  The Commission also concluded that 
because most UHF stations could not attract an audience comparable to their 
competitors on the VHF band, they were forced to operate on a marginal basis or 
cease operating altogether.  Id. 
 55. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 103 (noting some of the difficulties that 
UHF television faced at the outset, such as the fact that most television sets were built 
for VHF reception only, that UHF tuning was more difficult, and its signals were 
poorer). 
 56. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 356 (reporting that the production 
of all-channels sets peaked at thirty-five percent in early 1953 and dropped below 
nine percent by 1958).  The absence of demand for all-channel sets gave 
manufacturers little incentive to produce sets with more features.  Id. 
 57. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23 (noting that the limitation placed on 
UHF stations with respect to their operating power was exacerbated by the existing 
technical handicap of poor signal quality, as well as viewers’ preference for pre-
existing VHF stations). 
 58. NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 103. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 325 (noting that the first owners of 
UHF stations invested upwards of hundreds of thousands of dollars, only to find that 
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affiliating with UHF stations, and many of those who did so out of 
necessity changed their affiliation once the first VHF station 
appeared in the community.61  Independent UHF stations could not 
take advantage of the economies of scale and the large audiences that 
their VHF counterparts had, and therefore, could not afford to air 
attractive programs.62  Soon, UHF stations found themselves suffering 
from a vicious cycle of problems that managed to keep them in 
virtual ruin until the FCC focused its efforts on fostering their 
success.63 
B. Cleaning Up the UHF Mess 
Reversing the overwhelming failure of UHF stations during their 
first ten years of existence required creative thinking.  These stations 
had to overcome technical inequalities; market intermixture with 
technically superior and vastly-favored VHF stations; and lack of 
confidence in the capabilities and need for UHF television.64  The 
Commission considered many potential solutions, but committed 
itself to only a fraction of these.65 
At first, deintermixture was a fairly popular idea.66  Despite its early 
resistance, the Commission seriously considered separating markets 
                                                          
few advertisers cared about UHF stations and their tiny audiences). Sterling and 
Kittross compare many of the early difficulties of FM radio with those facing UHF 
stations because both services struggled to find network affiliation and advertiser 
interest in their early days, and both faced audiences who were content with their 
pre-existing stations on other frequency bands.  Id. 
 61. See id. at 356 (stating that both networks and advertisers used a method called 
“circulation,” which counted “unique” viewers to determine where to award 
affiliations and contracts). 
 62. OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23; see also NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 
103 (noting that UHF stations often had difficulty generating revenue because their 
low budgets could only create low-quality programming, which resulted in a low 
volume of viewers, which in turn resulted in low advertising revenue). 
 63. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23 (calling the UHF situation a 
“chicken and egg” problem because the absence of network affiliation for UHF 
stations at that time limited the advertising demand for them, and in turn, the 
weakness of UHF stations hindered the development of a fourth network). 
 64. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶ 36 (noting that by 
1955, over ninety percent of the population could receive service from at least one 
television station, but that the Commission still faced major obstacles to its goals of 
providing broad access to television across the country and competition in each 
television market by using both the UHF and VHF bands).  In 1955, the major 
challenges facing struggling UHF stations were VHF-only receivers, VHF program 
and revenue preferences, and UHF transmitter and receiver deficiencies.  Id. 
 65. See STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 357-58 (explaining that the 
Commission found that some proposals would not be effective to help UHF stations 
or to solve the interference problem between VHF stations, and that others were 
simply politically or technically infeasible); see also The Darkened Channels, supra note 
8, at 1583-93 (outlining various Commission plans to remedy the ailments of 
unsuccessful UHF stations, such as deintermixture and VHF drop-ins). 
 66. See The Darkened Channels, supra note 8, at 1584 (naming Madison, Peoria, 
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such that some would receive all-UHF television, and some all-VHF.67  
Eventually, and perhaps ironically, this idea gave way to a proposal 
for an all-UHF television transition, which never became a reality.68  
The Commission also considered policies of selective deintermixture 
and “VHF squeeze-ins,” whereby VHF allocations would be taken 
from other uses and the entire band would be dedicated to 
television.69  Pay or subscription television was yet another idea 
floated through the Commission.70  Under that plan, UHF would 
operate like cable or like the subscription-based movie channels 
common today.71  None of these ideas ever seriously took hold, and 
UHF television languished for some time.72  It was almost a decade 
after the publication of the Sixth Report and Order of 1952 before 
Congress took an initiative to help the drowning UHF stations. 
In 1962, Congress passed the All-Channel Receiver Act, giving the 
FCC the authority to require manufacturers to make television 
receivers capable of receiving both UHF and VHF channels.73  This 
                                                          
Hartford, and Evansville as cities that petitioned the FCC in 1954 and 1955 for 
deintermixture). 
 67. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 36-37 (providing a 
short history of FCC solutions for struggling UHF television stations through 1977, 
and concluding that neither deintermixture nor squeeze-ins would adequately serve 
the Commission’s long-range objectives of making use of both UHF and VHF bands 
to provide a wide variety of well-spaced signals in each community). 
 68. See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶¶ 22, 26  (rejecting the all 
UHF-television move based on the absence of any specific showings that justified 
such extensive reallocation of television service); STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, 
at 357 (asserting that although converting to an all-UHF system would equalize the 
competitive field among stations, it would be very expensive for VHF stations and 
would reduce the number of signals that rural areas could receive). 
 69. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 36-37 (finding that 
“squeeze-in” VHF stations would ultimately not serve the public’s best interests).  
Prior to the surge in television popularity, the military controlled many spots on the 
spectrum.  In 1939, for example, twenty-six percent of the frequencies below 162 
MHz were allocated exclusively to government agencies, including the military.  See 
SLOTTEN, supra note 32, at 146-48.  Today, the FCC reserves some low-frequency 
assignments for government uses, allocating some channels specifically for 
emergency uses.  Id. 
 70. STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 326. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. at 359 (explaining that because Congress made most of the FCC’s 
policy decisions, it was improbable that any Commission decision in the UHF area 
would take hold until members of Congress and their constituents resolved their 
conflicting viewpoints).  See generally 1977 Television Assignments Order, supra note 
23 (detailing the history of the Commission’s efforts assisting UHF television); 1978 
UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37 (discussing various solutions to the 
problems facing UHF television). 
 73. All-Channel Receiver Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150.  Under 
this authority the Commission required that all TV receivers be capable of UHF 
channel reception and adopted standards to make reception of UHF channels 
comparable with reception of VHF channels.  47 C.F.R. § 15.117 (2003).  See also 
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Notice of Inquiry, Broadcast 
Services, Advanced Television Systems, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,130, 42,137 (Aug. 15, 1995) 
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legislation was the first truly effective government effort towards UHF 
channels.  In the ten years after the All-Channel Act was passed, the 
UHF market grew by 111 stations while the VHF market added only 
forty-seven.74  The Commission continued to favor UHF between 1970 
and 1973 by requiring receivers to better tune into both UHF and 
VHF.75  Throughout the 1970s the Commission created several 
additional regulations mandating the improvement of television 
receivers as an effort to bridge the technical gap between VHF and 
UHF.76 
In 1978, the Commission created the UHF Comparability Task 
Force, which was dedicated to the improvement of UHF television 
service.77  By this time, television sets were receiving UHF, and the 
stations on this band had been around for some time.78  The 
challenges still facing UHF at this point were primarily technical.79  A 
1982 Report releasing the work of the UHF Task Force highlighted 
this challenge and indicated that if the technical gap could be 
                                                          
[hereinafter 1995 Fourth NPRM, Advanced Television Systems]. 
 74. Much of the burgeoning success of UHF after 1962 came directly from the 
Commission’s efforts to encourage its growth.  See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra 
note 45, ¶ 42.  In fact, the FCC concluded that the statutory enactment of the All-
Channel Receiver Law was an implicit directive to foster UHF television 
development, even at the expense of VHF television.  Id.  This mentality gave rise to 
the UHF Impact Policy, which would consider potential harm to UHF television over 
potential success of a VHF station until its abolition in the 1980s.  Id.  See also 
STERLING & KITTROSS, supra note 32, at 381 (citing the lack of desirable VHF channels 
as an additional factor in the rise in popularity of UHF channels between 1964-1974). 
 75. 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42, at 35,975. 
 76. For example, in 1978, the Commission acted to improve the quality of UHF 
pictures by lowering the maximum “noise” figure allowed on each receiver, which 
would reduce the amount of “snow” in each UHF picture displayed on a television 
set.  Id.  The Commission also stated its commitment to opening new proceedings 
designed to improve other aspects of UHF television performance, stating: 
These initiatives will provide us with the opportunity to review from 
television station studio to home video screen virtually all of the technical 
factors which influence quality of UHF home television reception. We 
believe that this is the best concentrated effort that we can undertake to help 
UHF television at this time. 
In the Matter of UHF Television Receiver Noise Figures, 69 F.C.C.2d 1866, ¶ 2 
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 UHF Receiver Noise Figures].  These efforts paid off:  In 
1974, forty-eight percent of the UHF television stations reported financial data 
indicating profitability that year.  See 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 49.  
The amount of households with UHF receivers increased by thirty-four percent in 
just five years, to eighty-nine percent of households nationwide by 1974.  Id. 
 77. See 1978 UHF Television Improvement NOI, supra note 37, ¶ 1 (“Congress 
approved a $750,000 appropriation and created five staff positions to examine 
comparability for UHF and VHF television. Pub. L. No. 95-431, 92 Stat. 1040 
(October 10, 1978).”) 
 78. See id. ¶ 7 (noting that the UHF television band was available for commercial 
use in 1952). 
 79. See id. ¶ 18 (listing the potential areas of improvement that the task force 
would evaluate, such as antenna height, quality of antennas and receivers, and 
technical improvements to television sets). 
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bridged, UHF had the potential to be quite profitable.80  The 
subsequent efforts of the FCC to bridge this gap through regulation 
proved extremely effective, and UHF television quickly reached 
viability.81  
C. Creating the UHF Discount 
In 1984, the Commission increased the national broadcast 
ownership limit on commercial television stations from seven to 
twelve.82  Under the new rule, a company was permitted to own as 
many as twelve television stations, provided that these stations did not 
collectively reach more than twenty-five percent of the nation’s 
viewing audience.83  From this time until the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996, an entity could own television stations with an aggregate, 
national reach of twenty-five percent of television-ready households.84  
The stated purpose of these rules was to weigh all of the 
Commission’s goals and strike a balance between proper regulation 
and healthy competition.85  The Commission is dedicated to 
promoting competition from smaller or independent media owners 
and the “diversification of program and service viewpoints.”86  At the 
same time, the Commission has an interest in allowing common 
ownership of media outlets so that market power of companies can 
grow and allow “efficiencies to be realized.”87 
                                                          
 80. See 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42, at 35,975 (observing 
that perfect equality between UHF and VHF is not required in order to achieve a 
“diverse and competitive UHF television service,” and advocating a “viable and 
profitable UHF service on its own merits, without comparison to VHF”). 
 81. For a detailed discussion of the regulations created to foster the growth of 
UHF television see infra Part III.B. 
 82. See In the Matter of Amendment of Section 73.3555, [formerly Sections 
73.35, 73.240, and 73.636] of the Commission’s Rules Relating to Multiple 
Ownership of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, 100 F.C.C.2d 17, ¶¶ 4-10 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Multiple Ownership 
Order] (concluding that the profound changes in American broadcasting over the 
three decades since the Commission adopted the Seven Station Rule necessitated a 
change in policy). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id.; see also Implementation of Sections 202(c)(1) and 202(e) of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (National Broadcast Television Ownership and 
Dual Network Operations), 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (2003) (“Section 73.3555(e) of the 
Commission’s Rules will be revised to reflect the changes directed by section 
202(c)(1) of the Telecom Act . . . by increasing the national audience reach 
limitation for television stations to 35%.”).  National ownership was calculated then 
as it is today.  However, the Commission has made a subtle shift in its definition of 
television markets, as it currently uses Designated Market Areas (“DMA”), which are 
assigned by Nielson Media Research.  § 73.3555(b). 
 85. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,752. 
 86. Id. at 65,768-69. 
 87. Id.  The Commission justified the increase in the multiple ownership rule by 
contending that the threat of scarcity in media was largely outdated.  In the 1984 
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When the Commission initially adopted this twelve station rule, it 
treated UHF stations and VHF stations identically in its calculation.88  
Three parties subsequently petitioned the Commission for 
reconsideration on this matter, asking that the rule give an extra 
audience reach for UHF stations.89  The Commission considered the 
issue, taking into account the evaluation of its UHF Comparability 
Task Force, which found that the ultimate challenge facing UHF was 
its physical inability to reach viewers.90  The Commision concluded 
that there was “demonstrable progress in the viability of UHF 
television,” but ultimately decided that the national multiple 
ownership rules should reflect the ongoing physical limitations of the 
UHF signal.91 
The Commission reasoned that it could best compensate for UHF 
television’s technical weaknesses by expanding the authorized 
audience reach limit for UHF stations.92  It found that this system 
would provide a measure of the actual voice handicap of UHF 
stations and, therefore, would be consistent with its traditional 
objectives of localism, diversity, and competition.93  The rulemaking 
amending the national ownership calculation ordered that UHF 
stations should be attributed with only fifty percent of a recognized 
television market, or Area of Dominant Influence (“ADI”).94  The rule 
provides that the Commission will count a station on the UHF band 
as fifty-percent of a station on the VHF band when calculating the 
aggregate national ownership percentage belonging to a media 
                                                          
Report and Order increasing the station limit from seven to twelve, the Commission 
cited improvements in technology, changes in spectrum regulation, and expanding 
audience and advertising markets as evidence of this shift.  See 1984 Multiple 
Ownership Order, supra note 82, ¶ 7.  In addition, the Commission stated that FM 
radio stations and UHF television stations have emerged as thriving rivals of other 
broadcasting outlets.  Id. 
 88. 1984 Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 82, ¶ 5. 
 89. 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶ 12 (“In 
establishing an audience reach cap, Group W, Cox and MPAA each propose that the 
Commission adopt rules which take cognizance of the difficulties faced by UHF 
stations.  Both Cox and Group W propose an additional reach limit of 2.5% for UHF 
stations . . . .”). 
 90. See id. ¶¶ 42-44 (“Due to the physical nature of the UHF and VHF bands, 
delivery of television signals is inherently more difficult at UHF. It should be 
recognized that actual equality between these two services cannot be expected 
because the laws of physics dictate that UHF signal strength will decrease more 
rapidly with distance than does VHF signal strength.”). 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. (refusing to simply increase the number of stations a company may 
own with respect to UHF stations, reasoning that this does not adequately remedy 
the physical limitations of the UHF signal). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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entity.95  It assumes that the UHF signal only reaches half the 
distance, and therefore, half the viewers of a VHF signal.96  For 
example, the theoretical ADI audience reach of the New York City 
market comprises 7.72% of all television households.97  Under the 
UHF discount provision, the owner of a UHF station in this market 
would be attributed with an audience reach of only fifty percent of 
this 7.72%, which equals 3.86% points towards national ownership.98  
Accordingly, a broadcast company can own two UHF stations for 
every one VHF station under the national ownership cap limitation.  
Thus, the “two-for-one” deal of the UHF discount was born. 
III. IT IS TIME FOR THE FCC TO ELIMINATE THE UHF DISCOUNT 
UHF stations have advanced considerably since the Sixth Report 
and Order of 1952.  Technological change, especially UHF signal 
improvements and the advent of cable television, began to bridge the 
gap between UHF and VHF television as far back the 1970s.99 
Currently, there are approximately four times more UHF stations on 
the air than VHF stations.100  Networks that primarily affiliate with 
UHF stations are among the most successful in the media 
marketplace.101  The UHF discount reflects a market that existed over 
twenty years ago, and the Commission cannot justify maintaining a 
rule that reflects a world that no longer exists.102  The Commission 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman, President and CEO, Media Access 
Project, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission (May 
29, 2003) (summarizing the Commission’s own findings of technical equality 
between UHF and VHF television).  When Media Access Project filed this letter in 
opposition to the Biennial Broadcast Review Rules, it attached copied pages from the 
Economic Analysis relied upon by the Commission in its decision to repeal the Prime 
Time Access Rule.  Id.  This study states that “[t]here is no evidence that the UHF 
handicap persists today” and asserts that the government interference with these 
stations “makes society as a whole worse off.”  ECONOMISTS INCORPORATED, PRIME TIME 
ACCESS RULE:  A SUPPLEMENTARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23, 58 (1995). 
 100. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (“Over-the-
air outlets include 1,331 commercial TV stations (752 UHF, 579 VHF) and 381 non-
commercial, educational TV stations (254 UHF, 127 VHF).”). 
 101. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (ranking Viacom, which owns former 
CBS and UPN (United Paramount) Groups, the top-ranked network in America, 
with Fox coming in as the second-ranked network).  The success of “baby networks” 
such as the WB and UPN, which affiliate primarily with UHF stations, is the kind of 
evidence that convinced the Commission to repeal other regulatory assistance 
measures designed to foster the growth of UHF television.  See 1995 PTAR Order, 
supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-3, 70-80. 
 102. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56 
(2003) (requiring the Commission to examine its rules biennially and retain only 
those “necessary in the public interest as a result of competition”).  Courts have held 
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has repealed every other regulatory assistance to television stations on 
this band, and has amassed innumerable findings along the way 
showing the robust health of UHF television.103  Keeping the UHF 
discount in the face of this evidence is an unacceptable inconsistency 
on the part of the FCC.104 
The most egregious effect of the UHF discount today is its 
encouragement of ownership consolidation in broadcast television.105  
The largest media companies easily take advantage of the “two-for-
one” deal on UHF stations under the current rules, and thereby own 
far more television stations than is allowed under the ownership cap.  
Media concentration on this level poses a direct threat to 
competition, diversity, and localism because it shuts smaller 
competitors and independent owners out of the media market.106  
Thus when the Commission voted to raise the national ownership cap 
to forty-five percent, it in fact elevated the cap much higher for 
broadcast owners with the greatest buying power.107  If keeping the 
UHF discount posed a direct threat to the public interest before 
June 2, 2003, perpetuating this provision while raising the national 
ownership cap is a fatal blow to this principle. 
A. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Commission’s Mandate to 
Update Broadcast Regulations 
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides 
that the Commission shall review its ownership rules on a biennial 
basis and “shall determine whether any of such rules are necessary in 
                                                          
that this section carries with it a presumption toward change.  See 2002 Biennial 
Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287.  Thus, unless the 
Commission issues a report detailing its justification for maintaining a broadcast 
rule, it must repeal or modify any existing rule.  H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148 
(1999). 
 103. The Commission has issued various decisions over the past ten years 
repealing regulatory assistance measures designed to foster the growth of UHF 
stations.  See, e.g., 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 4 
(repealing the Secondary Affilation Rule); 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-4 
(repealing the Prime Time Access Rule); 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 
14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (repealing the UHF Impact Policy and the Carroll Doctrine). 
 104. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,340-
41 (citing, in direct opposition to its previous findings, that UHF television has not 
reached viability, that it continues to suffer from a technical handicap with respect to 
VHF television, and that cable has not grown pervasive enough to justify eliminating 
the rule). 
 105. Six of the largest broadcast companies, all of which have taken advantage of 
the UHF discount, find themselves far above the ownership cap when the UHF 
provision is eliminated.  See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (showing the top twenty-
five TV-station groups and their national broadcast ownership with and without the 
UHF discount). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
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the public interest as the result of competition.  The Commission 
shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in 
the public interest.”108  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, 
which has jurisdiction over the FCC, has determined that this 
provision of the 1996 Act carries with it a presumption in favor of 
repealing or modifying ownership rules.109  If the Commission 
chooses instead to retain a rule under review, the Conference Report 
accompanying the Act demands that the agency issue a report that 
includes a full justification of the basis for so finding.110  Thus, the 
Commission should eliminate the UHF discount if it has evidence of 
the viability of UHF television that could establish that this assistance 
is no longer in the public interest.  This section argues that the 
Commission has exactly such evidence, and accordingly, should have 
repealed this rule in its most recent review. 
The first major aid to UHF television since its inception fifty years 
ago came from the evolution of viewer behavior.  Although viewers 
once shied away from the stations on UHF, evidence of the growth of 
stations on this signal proves that audience prejudice has changed.111  
In 1975, for example, there were only 344 UHF stations.112  Today, 
that number has grown to 931.113  There are approximately three 
times more UHF stations today than in the 1970s.  VHF stations, by 
contrast, have only grown from 609 to 688.114 
The primary developments that have equalized UHF and VHF 
television, however, are technological.  Over the past thirty years, 
improvements in the design of television receivers substantially 
improved the quality of reception of UHF stations in over-the-air 
(non-cable) television.115  These changes came largely through 
Commission regulations designed to bridge the technical gap 
between the two signals.116 
                                                          
 108. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56 
(2003). 
 109. See, e.g., Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 280 F.3d 1027, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 
2002) (concluding that the Commission may only retain a rule if it is necessary in the 
public interest). 
 110. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 106-464, at 148 (1999). 
 111. For more figures showing the growth of UHF stations see supra Part III.A and 
infra Part III.B. 
 112. 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 18-26. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 123 (noting that thirty years ago the UHF 
handicap was waning, due partly to the rise in popularity of cable, and in part 
because FCC regulations mandated improvements to UHF receivers). 
 116. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Commission’s regulations and policies 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s that were designed to improve the technical 
qualities of the UHF signal). 
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Cable television finally closed the gap between UHF and VHF 
television.  Most Americans today likely could not distinguish 
between stations on these two bands because of cable.  Approximately 
eighty-five percent of households nationwide receive their television 
through some kind of cable or satellite service.117   Further, cable now 
“passes” through over ninety-seven percent of all homes, which 
means that almost every household in America is able to receive cable 
if desired.118  This figure is up from seventy-five percent in 1985.119  
Over cable, VHF and UHF channels are equal, both in the distance of 
each signal’s reach and in picture quality.120  Additionally, in order to 
ensure equal treatment of UHF and VHF over cable, Congress passed 
the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 
1992, which requires cable operators to carry a certain number of 
local over-the-air broadcast signals.121  In short, cable is the great 
                                                          
 117. Currently over 106 million television households in United States are served 
by a variety of video outlets.  See Comments of the United Church of Christ, Black 
Citizens for a Fair Media, Civil Rights Forum, Philadelphia Lesbian and Gay Task 
Force, and Women’s Institute for Freedom of the Press, In the Matter of 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rule and 
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local 
Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, MB Docket No. 02-277, MM Docket Nos. 01-
235, 01-317, 00-244, at 57 (Jan. 2, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review) [hereinafter UCC et al. Comments] (placing the number of households 
subscribing to standard cable at 69 million nationwide); 2002 Biennial Broadcast 
Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (citing Nielson Media Research). 
 118. Statement of Commission Kevin Martin, In the Matter of Annual Assessment 
of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 
17 F.C.C.R. 1244, ¶ 17 (2001). 
 119. Only thirty-seven million households subscribed to cable in 1985, while sixty-
nine million subscribe today. See UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 57 (citing 
JONATHAN LEVY ET AL., BROADCAST TELEVISION:  SURVIVOR IN A SEA OF COMPETITION 41 
(2002)). 
 120. See In the Matter of Broadcast Television National Ownership Rules—Review 
of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television Broadcasting, Television 
Satellite Stations Review of Policy and Rules, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 
F.C.C.R. 19,949, ¶¶ 11-16 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM] 
(describing the narrowing gap between the two frequency bands); 1995 Review of 
Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 20 (noting that the role of cable carriage has 
decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations). 
 121. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (“Each cable operator shall carry, on the 
cable system of that operator, the signals of local commercial television stations and 
qualified low power stations as provided by this section . . . .”); FCC Broadcast Radio 
Services, 47 C.F.R. § 76.56 (2001) (mandating the carriage of noncommercial 
television stations).  At one time, the precarious constitutional standing of these 
must-carry rules served as an argument for retaining the UHF discount.  See 1996 
Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 9-16.  ALTV and Silver King, 
commenting in favor of retaining the UHF discount, contended that the then-
uncertain state of the must-carry rules required that the UHF discount remain in 
effect because without a must-carry requirement, UHF stations would be at a greater 
disadvantage due to the additional and expensive technical requirements they must 
overcome.  Id.  However, the Supreme Court has since upheld the constitutionality of 
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equalizer of television signals, and the vast majority of Americans 
have cable.  Thus, the Commission is perpetuating the UHF discount 
for approximately three percent of the country—hardly a regulation 
in the name of the public interest. 
Notably, as early as 1989, the Commission sought comments on 
whether the UHF discount itself was becoming unnecessary because 
of the pervasiveness of cable.122  At that time, just over sixty percent of 
households subscribed to cable, a level of access sufficient for the 
Commission to begin seriously considering eliminating this rule at 
that time.123 
Ironically, the majority stated throughout the 2002 Broadcast 
Review that changes in technology and within the marketplace call 
for changes in broadcast rules.124  Nevertheless, the empirical 
evidence demonstrating the advancement of UHF television, in 
addition to the Commission’s own findings of technological 
improvements and UHF viability, were ineffective to convince the 
Commission to eliminate the UHF discount.125 
                                                          
these rules in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997), noting: 
Must-carry was designed to serve three interrelated interests:  
(1) preservingthe benefits of free, over-the-air local broadcast television, 
(2) promoting the widespread dissemination of information from a 
multiplicity of sources, and (3) promoting fair competition in the market for 
television programming market. 
Id. at 189 (internal quotations omitted). 
 122. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, at ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (repealing 
the UHF Impact Policy). 
 123. See id. (confirming that the ever-decreasing difference between UHF and 
VHF was enough to repeal the provision); see also Bill McConnell, Capitol’s Goodmon 
Urges End to UHF Discount, BROAD. & CABLE, May 30, 2003, at 
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA302578 (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (reporting that the head of Capitol Broadcasting Company 
asserted that the discount is no longer necessary and is in fact harmful to the public 
interest, citing the negligible difference between a station signal on each band as 
support for his position). 
 124. See Broadcast Ownership Rules, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and 
Newspapers, Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local Markets, and 
Definition of Radio Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620, ¶ 3 (2003). 
Americans today have more media choices, more sources of news and 
information, and more varied entertainment programming available to them 
than ever before. A generation ago, only science fiction writers dreamed of 
satellite-delivered television, cable was little more than a means of delivering 
broadcast signals to remote locations, and the seeds of the Internet were just 
being planted in a Department of Defense project. Today, hundreds of 
channels of video programming are available in every market in the country 
and, via the Internet, Americans can access virtually any information, 
anywhere, on any topic. 
Id.; see also FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration, 2003 WL 21251881 (June 2, 2003) 
(noting the FCC’s findings that Americans rely on a variety of media outlets, not just 
broadcast television, for news and information). 
 125. See Statement of Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein, Dissenting, Regarding 
the 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast 
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The Commission has evidence of changes to UHF television that 
render the UHF discount unnecessary.  According to the 
presumption in favor of change that Section 202 carries, the 
Commission should have eliminated this rule.  Giving evidence 
different weight in different situations, as it appears the Commission 
does with facts showing technological advancements and a changed 
marketplace, creates analytical inconsistency.  Greater still is the 
inconsistency between the Commission’s hands-off approach to the 
UHF discount and the line of decisions eliminating other regulations 
that assisted once-ailing UHF stations. 
B. Maintaining the UHF Discount is Inconsistent with a Line of Decisions 
Eliminating Regulatory Assistance Measures for UHF Television 
The Commission’s findings throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
indicated that the gap between UHF and VHF television was drawing 
to a close.126  Throughout those decades, the Commission began 
repealing regulations designed to aid UHF stations based on 
evidence showing their technical improvement and economic 
viability.127  These Orders show the years of findings that spurred the 
recission of many rules, providing logical support for the elimination 
of the UHF discount.  Inexplicably, the Commission has failed to 
consider this evidence as grounds to do so. 
A close look at the history of FCC rulemakings shows that the 
Commission began to change its attitude toward protecting UHF 
                                                          
Ownership Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act 
of 1996 (Jun. 2, 2003), at http:// hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-235047A8.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review) (“If the 
purpose of this exercise is to update our rules in light of technological developments, 
we can’t ignore some just because we don’t like the outcome of more stringent 
limits.”); Owen Gibson, U.S. Plans Radical Revamp of Media Ownership Rules, GUARDIAN, 
May 13, 2003 (citing Gene Kimmelman of the Consumer’s Union:  “If the theory 
behind changing the rules is that the FCC needs to keep up with market conditions, 
to preserve a significant discount for UHF stations is simply a fraud on the regulatory 
process . . . .”), available at http://media.guardian.com/Uk/Print/0,3858,4667699-
105240,00.html.  Another controversial argument regarding the Commission’s 
inconsistency in its most recent Broadcast Order is that the Commission chose to 
maintain the UHF discount provision for the television duopoly rule, but discarded it 
in media cross-ownership regulations and for the local ownership rule.  See Adelstein, 
supra (calling this phenomenon the Commission’s “most inexplicable 
inconsistency”).  But see 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 
4, at 46,299 (arguing that these rules regulate different media entities and different 
ownership situations, and should thus be construed differently). 
 126. See 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16 (describing the 
narrowing gap in signal quality between UHF and VHF signals and how it requires a 
review of existing law). 
 127. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,348-
49 (describing how the FCC’s biennial reviews take into account the changing 
technology in the decision to change existing rules). 
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stations as early as 1977.128  In 1960, the Commission sought to protect 
UHF stations with the UHF Impact Policy, which restricted the 
competition presented by new VHF television stations to UHF 
stations.129  Under the UHF Impact Policy, a UHF station owner could 
prevent the Commission from granting a license to a new VHF station 
by proving that building this station would cause the UHF station 
economic harm.130  Subsequent technical advancements to television 
sets and UHF receivers fostered the growth of UHF television, and by 
the mid 1970s, the Commission substantially relaxed this competitive 
restriction.131 
In 1988 the Commission eliminated the UHF Impact Policy, 
finding that the UHF service had achieved a sufficient degree of 
comparability with the VHF service to obviate the need for this 
restriction.132  Findings showed that UHF television had improved 
“dramatically,” and that the signal disparities between UHF and VHF 
service had been largely eliminated.133  Numerous findings like this 
kindled a wave of rulemakings in the late 1980s and throughout the 
1990s eliminating provisions that were designed to compensate for 
the technical and market handicaps of UHF television.134  The 
Commission found that restricting competition from VHF stations 
against UHF stations was no longer necessary in the public interest.135 
In 1995, the Commission repealed the Secondary Affiliations rule, 
which was created in 1971 to encourage greater access to network 
programming for then-struggling UHF stations.136  When the 
                                                          
 128. See 1977 Television Assignment Order, supra note 23, ¶¶ 2-5, 47-48 
(reexamining UHF Impact Policy restrictions in light of the health of UHF 
television). 
 129. See id. 
 130. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, ¶ 1. 
 131. See 1977 Television Assignments Order, supra note 23, ¶ 48 (changing the 
UHF Impact Policy to favor VHF stations by holding that “regardless of the 
characterization of the impact on UHF, a VHF applicant may now demonstrate by 
countervailing evidence, that, overall, the weight of the public interest favors the 
grant of an application . . . .” ). 
 132. See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31, 47 
(concluding that continuing this policy would likely produce negative effects on the 
public interest by hindering the introduction of new VHF service). 
 133. See id. ¶ 27 (concluding that the “dramatic improvement” to UHF television 
resulted from the continuing growth of the television market and Commission 
requirements for changes in television receiver designs that significantly eradicated 
the technical handicap of the UHF signal service). 
 134. See 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 1-3, 76-80 (repealing the Prime Time 
Access Rule); 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 4-26 
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule and the Network Station Ownership Rule). 
 135. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 4-26. 
 136. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26 
(ordering the elimination of both the Secondary Affiliation Rule and the Network 
Station Ownership Rule).  The Network Station Ownership rule was not specifically 
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Secondary Affiliation Rule was adopted, there were certain markets 
with two VHF network affiliates and one UHF independent station.  
In such markets, the third network would choose to place its 
programs on one or both of the VHF stations on a secondary basis 
rather than to affiliate with the UHF station.137  The provision 
restricted a station from acquiring a second network affiliation by 
directing that a network first offer affiliation to an independent, 
unaffilliated station.138  The basic goal underlying the Commission’s 
adoption of the Secondary Affiliation Rule was to increase the 
likelihood that UHF television would develop into a viable and 
competitive service.139 
By the mid 1990s, however, the Commission could not ignore the 
improvement of UHF television, and repealed the Secondary 
Affiliation Rule based on two major factors:  (1) the improvement of 
UHF reception; and (2) the increased availability of programming 
and competition for affiliates.140  The Commission concluded that 
these developments removed the factors for which the Secondary 
Affiliation Rule was designed to compensate.141  It found that 
independent UHF stations had become more competitive despite 
their lack of affiliation with the traditional networks and concluded 
that they no longer appear to need regulatory assistance to attract 
affiliations of new networks.142 
                                                          
created to assist UHF stations, and thus is not treated in the text of this Comment.  
See id. ¶¶ 1-11.  This rule was created to preserve localism of television in rural areas.  
Id.  The Commission decided to eliminate this rule based on technological 
advancements since its inception in 1946 and the growth of media outlets in rural 
areas, reasoning that both have rendered this limitation on networks unnecessary 
and overly restrictive.  Id. 
 137. Id. ¶¶ 12-14. 
 138. Id. ¶ 12.  The Secondary Affiliate Rule required that in TV markets where two 
of the three traditional networks already have an affiliate, a network with no affiliate 
in the market must offer prime-time programs and weekend sports events to 
independent stations with facilities comparable to the other network affiliates (UHF 
or VHF) before offering the programs to either of the two affiliated stations.  Id. 
 139. See id. ¶¶ 12-26 (recounting the difficulty that UHF stations had attracting 
network affiliation in 1971). 
 140. Id. ¶¶ 18-26. The Order asserted that advances in television design and the 
role of cable carriage had decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations, and 
that these developments had “substantially alleviated” the technical disadvantages 
facing UHF receivers.  Id. ¶ 20. 
 141. Id.; see also supra Part III.A (describing the Commission’s findings of the 
growth and viability of UHF stations). 
 142. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 22 (finding that of 
Fox’s 140 primary affiliates, 121 (86%) are UHF stations; of United Paramount’s 95 
affiliates, 78 (82%) are UHF stations; and of Warner Brothers 43 affiliates, 34 (79%) 
are UHF stations).  Notably, the successful affiliation of UHF stations was not a result 
of the Secondary Affiliation Rule, because none of the newer networks, such as Fox, 
United Paramount, and Warner Brothers, were subject to the rule.  Rather, these 
networks chose to affiliate with UHF stations of their own accord.  Id. 
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The 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order is a powerful piece of 
evidence showing the Commission’s acknowledgement of UHF 
viability and foreshadows a general movement away from regulations 
assisting UHF television.  Specifically, the Commission found a 250% 
growth in the number UHF stations over the previous two decades as 
well as a tripling of profits over the previous year.143  The Order noted 
the recent elimination of the Secondary Affiliation rule, and 
previewed its request for comments on the comparability between 
UHF and VHF television.144  While this Order did not do away with all 
regulatory assistance measures for UHF television, the fact that the 
Commission was seeking comment on the topic is proof of the 
Commission’s inference, almost ten years ago, that UHF television 
could be healthy enough to stand on its own. 
The next UHF assistance measure that met its end in 1995 was the 
Prime Time Access Rule (“PTAR”).145  PTAR prohibited network-
affiliated television stations in the top fifty television markets from 
broadcasting more than three hours of network programs during the 
four prime time viewing hours.146  This rule was created in 1970 in 
response to a concern that the three major television networks—
ABC, CBS, and NBC—dominated the program production market 
and inhibited the development of competing program sources.147  
The rule was seen as a way to promote the growth of independent 
stations by preventing them from competing with Top 50 Market 
Affiliates in acquiring off-network programs.148  The Commission 
found that the rule did not address the technical disparity between 
UHF and VHF, but rather provided a competitive advantage to 
independent stations by limiting the programming options available 
to Top 50 Market Affiliates, even in cases where the affected network 
affiliates were themselves UHF stations.149  Ultimately, the FCC 
                                                          
 143. Id. ¶ 23.  The Commission found that in 1971, there were 179 commercial 
UHF television stations on the air and as of December 31, 1994, the number of 
commercial UHF stations had risen to 601, an increase of 235 percent.  Id.  It further 
stated that profits for UHF independents, on average, have risen dramatically since 
that year.  Id.  In 1992, average profits were $552,000, and in 1993, average profits 
tripled to $ 1.5 million.  Id. 
 144. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶ 23.  Here, the 
Commission recognized that the UHF service had achieved enough comparability 
with VHF to eliminate the Secondary Affiliation Rule and noted the elimination of 
the UHF Impact Policy in 1987.  It asserted that this degree of comparability may not 
be enough to warrant the rescission of all rules designed to promote UHF stations, 
but asked for comment on the issue of VHF/UHF comparability.  Id. 
 145. See 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 77-80. 
 146. Id. ¶ 1. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. ¶ 79. 
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concluded that the UHF handicap did not justify continuing the 
Prime Time Access Rule.150 
In the Review of the Prime Time Access Rule Order, the 
Commission recognized the robust growth of UHF television, as well 
as the vast improvements to quality of the UHF signal, and found that 
the pervasiveness of cable removes all disparities between UHF and 
VHF television in almost every home in the nation.151  The 
Commission also found that the development of the new networks, 
such as United Paramount Network (“UPN”) and Warner Brothers’ 
WB network were indications of the health of UHF television, as these 
networks affiliate primarily with UHF stations. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Telecommunications Act.152  This law 
made sweeping changes to broadcast ownership rules, and mandated 
that the Commission review its broadcast rules biennially.153  The Act 
was explicitly silent with respect to the UHF discount.154  However, 
growing evidence of unprecedented media concentration, and the 
role that the UHF discount played in this concentration, became a 
concern for the Commission.155  As a result, in its first Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking after the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the 
Commission sought comments on retaining the discount based on its 
findings that technological advancements and the high penetration 
rate of cable may have rendered the provision unnecessary.156 
                                                          
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 76-80; see also Letter from Andrew Jay Schwartzman to Marlene H. 
Dortch, supra note 99 (summarizing many arguments in favor of repealing the UHF 
discount, such as the inconsistency of its use in Commission rules, as well as the 
advances in technology and viewer behavior that have rendered it unnecessary). 
 152. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
 153. Before the 1996 Act, media entities were not allowed to own more than 
twelve television stations, or own stations that would, in the aggregate, result in 
national aggregate ownership of more than twenty-five percent. 1996 Broadcast 
Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16. 
 154. Telecommunications Act of 1996; 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra 
note 120, ¶¶ 1-16. 
 155. See Sinclair Broad. Group v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148, 160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(discussing the Commission’s recognition of growing consolidation, as well as the 
findings that put them on notice).  The Court further noted that since the passage of 
the 1996 Telecommunication Act there has been a “resultant downward trend in the 
number of station owners in each market.”  Id.  This consolidation prompted the 
Commission to “engage in an exercise in line drawing” between allowing 
broadcasters to realize economic efficiencies on one hand, and ensuring diversity 
and competition on the other hand.  Id. 
 156. 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶¶ 1-16.  This Notice also 
sought comments on whether the Commission should impose supplementary 
limitations on the national ownership reach until the UHF discount issue was 
resolved.  Id.  Thus, the Commission acknowledged in this Notice that the UHF 
discount encouraged media concentration by effectively raising the national 
ownership cap.  The Commission cautioned that an owner who was allowed to own 
thirty-five percent of the national audience could exercise too much control over the 
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In 1998, the Commission reconsidered the status of the UHF 
discount but concluded that the technical disparity between the 
signals had not been completely ameliorated and did not justify 
repealing the UHF discount, despite growing evidence from 
commentators that the handicaps facing UHF television had largely 
disappeared.157  Companies like ABC, CME Press Broadcasting, and 
Greater Media argued that the pervasiveness of cable, along with vast 
technical improvements in the industry had almost completely 
eliminated the reasons for the creation of the UHF discount.158 
The Commission is currently taking comments regarding the 
elimination of the discount based on whether or not the language of 
the 2004 Appropriations Act signifies “congressional approval, 
adoption or ratification” of the UHF discount.159  Beyond this 
consideration of congressional intent, the Commission’s posture on 
the UHF discount in the 2002 Biennial Review suggested that it will 
consider applying a sunset provision to the UHF discount once the 
transition to digital television is nearly complete, although it declined 
to fix a date for that transition.160  The Commission reasoned that 
digital television will “substantially equalize” UHF and VHF signals, 
but failed to explain how this “substantial equality” is more significant 
or persuasive than the “substantial alleviation” of the technical 
                                                          
media by virtue of the UHF discount.  Id. 
 157. See In the Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the 
Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to 
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 
11,058, ¶¶ 35-38 (2000) [hereinafter 1998 Biennial Broadcast Review Order] 
(concluding that the UHF discount remains necessary in the public interest because 
the handicap experienced by UHF stations has not yet been fully eliminated). 
 158. Id.  In addition, these companies proposed plans such as calculating the 
disparity on a market-by-market basis, or implementing a discount that properly 
reflects the large number o-f households who subscribe to cable, and thus, do not 
experience disparities between signals.  Id. 
 159. 2004 UHF Discount Comment Request, supra note 6, at 9215. 
 160. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Rules Order, supra note 4, at 43,337 
(reasoning that roughly thirty percent of televisions in the United States receive only 
free over-the-air television, and that UHF stations still cover smaller areas than VHF 
stations).  The Commission found that this technical inequality continues to effect 
UHF television’s ability to compete with VHF television.  Id.  The Commission 
further found that the UHF discount has promoted the entry of new broadcast 
networks into the market, which have improved consumer choice and program 
diversity for those with and without cable and satellite television service.  Id.  Notably, 
the Commission has not confirmed that it will eliminate this provision after the 
transition to digital cable.  Id.  Rather, it plans to sunset the application of the UHF 
discount for the stations owned by the top four broadcast networks (i.e., CBS, NBC, 
ABC and Fox) as the transition to digital television draws to a close, on a market-by-
market basis.  Id.  It further noted that “this sunset will apply unless, prior to that 
time, the Commission makes an affirmative determination that the public interest 
would be served by continuation of the discount beyond the digital transition.”  Id. at 
46,341. 
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inequalities the Commission found in 1995.161  Likewise, the 
Commission failed to explain why the equality brought to UHF and 
VHF by digital television is more persuasive than its 2002 finding that 
UHF and VHF signals were “largely equalized” over cable.162  This 
about-face is more inexplicable given that the Commission took 
comments on eliminating the UHF discount in the 2002 Biennial 
Review.163 
The Commission has gathered abundant evidence on the 
performance of UHF television, the growth of cable, and the effects 
of its own regulations to foster the growth of UHF stations.  Despite 
the strength of its findings on the health of UHF television, the 
Commission has failed to apply this evidence to the UHF discount.  
The improvements to UHF television that justified repealing three 
prior auxiliary regulations had not disappeared.164  Nevertheless, the 
Commission has refused to apply this evidence to the question of 
retaining the UHF discount.  Although the Commission designed 
each UHF-assistance rule to compensate for a different aspect of the 
UHF handicap,165 it should define viability consistently when 
describing UHF television in the marketplace.  From one order to the 
next, the Commission inconsistently evaluates UHF television stations 
                                                          
 161. In its 1995 Order eliminating the Secondary Affiliation rule, the Commission 
asserted that advances in television design and the role of cable carriage had 
decreased the gap between UHF and VHF stations, and that these developments 
“substantially alleviated” the technical disadvantages facing UHF receivers. 1995 
Review of Broadcast Rules, supra note 12, ¶ 20. 
 162. In the 2002 Biennial Review, the Commission refused to apply this evidence 
of signal equality or the advent of cable to the arguments for repealing the UHF 
discount.  2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341. 
 163. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,768.  In the 
Biennial Review the Commission questioned the extent of the UHF handicap today, 
noting that over eighty-six percent of consumers receive video programming, which 
equalizes UHF and VHF signals, and that the must-carry rules ensure that cable 
subscribers receive local UHF stations.  Id. 
 164. See 1998 Biennial Broadcast Review Order, supra note 157, ¶¶ 35-38 
(conceding that evidence of improvements to UHF television proved sufficient to 
repeal other regulatory assistance measures to these stations).  The order cites the 
repeal of the Prime Time Access Rule and the repeal of the Policy under which 
applications to initiate VHF service were considered contrary to the public interest if 
they threatened adverse economic impact on existing or potential UHF stations.  Id. 
¶ 35.  This Order fails to mention the repeal of the Secondary Affiliation rule 
discussed above, but it also falls in the same line of reasoning.  See 1995 Review of 
Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26 (repealing the Secondary 
Affiliation rule based on significant improvements to UHF television). 
 165. The Secondary Affiliation Rule was designed to help UHF stations attract 
network affiliates.  See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-
26.  The UHF Impact Policy was designed to give UHF stations preference over VHF 
stations in license applications and renewals.  See 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, 
supra note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31.  The UHF discount was initially designed to compensate 
for the technical handicap of the UHF signal.  See 1985 Amended Multiple 
Ownership Order, supra note 9, ¶ 5. 
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and the networks affiliated with them.  The Commission also 
inconsistently evaluates the viability of UHF television with respect to 
each rule.  For example, in the orders repealing the Secondary 
Affiliation Rule, UHF Impact Policy, and Prime Time Access Rule, 
the Commission asserts the viability of UHF television as justification 
for its decision.166  By contrast, the 2002 Biennial Review Order insists 
that disparities in economic and technical viability continue to exist 
between UHF and VHF stations sufficient to support the 
continuation of the UHF discount.167 
C. The UHF Discount Harms the Public Interest by Encouraging 
Media Concentration 
Ownership consolidation in the media marketplace decimates 
competition, localism, and diversity by centralizing the control of 
media outlets in the hands of very few.  The UHF discount 
encourages media concentration by effectively increasing the 
national ownership cap for broadcast companies that choose to 
purchase UHF stations.168  By allowing a “two-for-one” deal on UHF 
stations as compared to VHF stations, this provision allows broadcast 
companies with the greatest buying power to own far more stations 
than the national ownership cap permits.169  In the interest of 
preserving competition, localism, and diversity, the Commission 
should have eliminated the UHF discount while the ownership cap 
was at thirty-five percent.  After the 2002 broadcast review and 
subsequent amendments to the elevated ownership cap levels, it is 
more critical than ever to eliminate this provision in order to serve 
the public interest.170 
A close look at the holdings of the most powerful broadcast 
companies shows how severely the UHF discount distorts ownership 
                                                          
 166. See 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 18-26 
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation rule); 1988 Detrimental Effects Order, supra 
note 14, ¶¶ 1, 26-31 (eliminating the UHF Impact Policy); 1995 PTAR Order, supra 
note 14, ¶¶ 1-4, 18-25 (repealing the Prime Time Access Rule). 
 167. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,340-
41. 
 168. By counting each UHF station as one half of a VHF station, the discount 
allows media companies to own twice as many UHF stations as VHF stations, and, in 
total, many more stations than they could own if the rules counted both UHF and 
VHF stations as whole stations.  Zuckerman, supra note 3; Miller & Trigoboff, supra 
note 9. 
 169. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9. 
 170. Note that the current national ownership cap is set at thirty-nine percent 
according to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, § 
629, 118 Stat. 3. 
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calculations under Commission rules.171  When the ownership cap sat 
at thirty-five percent, some broadcast companies, like Fox and 
Viacom, violated these rules even with the UHF discount intact.172  
For example, Viacom has 39% coverage nationwide and Fox sits at 
37.8% when UHF stations are counted as one-half of VHF stations.173  
If the Commission had eliminated the UHF discount while 
maintaining the cap at thirty-five percent, many more companies 
would have found themselves in violation.  Paxson, without the UHF 
discount, has 68% national coverage; Viacom owns 44.8%, Univision 
41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%.174  Thus, well before the 
Commission acted to allow greater national ownership, broadcast 
companies with serious buying power were taking advantage of the 
UHF discount to stay within the rules.  This level of concentration, 
encouraged by the UHF discount, runs counter to the public interest. 
The Federal Communications Commission defines the public 
interest as that which maximizes competition, localism, and diversity 
in broadcast media.175  These tenets have provided the bedrock of the 
Commission’s broadcast rules since the advent of television.176  
Localism, for instance, has operated as a goal for broadcast television 
since its development in the 1940s and 1950s.177  In fact, the FCC 
issued most of its early broadcast regulations to maintain localism in 
mass media.178  The original Radio Act of 1927 focused on providing 
                                                          
 171. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (ranking the top twenty-five TV-station 
groups by using the FCC method of calculating national ownership reach). 
 172. See id. (explaining that these stations sit above the current cap because they 
were allowed to “grandfather” in these ownership relationships pending review of the 
ownership rules). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. For a more detailed discussion of the FCC and the public interest see supra 
Part II.A. 
 176. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,756 
(identifying the Commission’s three important public interest goals as “diversity, 
competition, and localism,” and asserting that the commission long embraced these 
values as the foundation of its ownership regulations and policies). 
 177. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 97-100 (asserting that a “local service 
doctrine” shaped the Commission’s early vision for broadcast, in which the 
Commission hoped that “[s]tations would be owned and operated by local residents, 
and would devote considerable broadcast time to information and commentary on 
important local issues”).  According to the Commission’s vision, “stations would be 
instruments for community enlightenment and cohesion, much like the hometown 
newspaper of an earlier era.” Id. at 100. 
 178. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760 
(explaining that “[f]rom the earliest days of broadcasting, federal regulators sought 
to foster the provision of programming that meets local communities’ needs and 
interests”); see also NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 97-128 (citing the role of the 
localism doctrine in regulations governing group ownership and cross-media 
ownership and suggesting that the Commission’s “localism doctrine” drove the 
promotion of UHF as a way to increase both competition and localism).  The 
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communications equally throughout the five original broadcast 
zones.179  Another major statutory basis for the primacy of localism in 
broadcasting is Section 307 of the Communications Act of 1934,180 
which has evolved into the Commission’s “local service” doctrine, 
marked by the Commission’s work to establish radio and television 
stations in as many communities as possible.181 
UHF television was a locally-minded answer to the television freeze 
of the 1950s because it created television stations for more 
communities.182  The FCC envisioned the television station owner as 
“a kind of latter-day Mark Twain who understands the needs and 
concerns of his community in an imaginative and sensitive way.”183  
Creating UHF television was the ideal way to reduce interference 
between existing stations and to unsaturate the VHF band while 
encouraging more communities to own local outlets.184 
The FCC’s efforts to develop UHF stations into healthy competitors 
fell in step with this notion of localism.185  Indeed, creating the UHF 
discount was another way to encourage localism by fostering the 
growth of these once-local stations.186  However, the ultimate effect of 
                                                          
Commission chose to increase the number of television stations by using the UHF 
band in addition to VHF, and chose to limit the power at which these new stations 
could operate in order to keep them as local as possible.  Id. at 101-04. 
 179. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 98-99 (noting a 1928 amendment to the Act 
that “required ‘equality’ of radio reception and transmission in each of the five 
broadcast zones set up in the original act”). 
 180. This provision of the Communications Act dates back to the Radio Act of 
1927, with modifications over time.  2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra 
note 24, at 65,760. 
 181. NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 98-99. Today, this provision states: 
In considering applications for licenses, and modifications and renewals 
thereof, when and insofar as there is demand for the same, the Commission 
shall make such distribution of licenses, frequencies, hours of operation, and 
of power among the several States and communities as to provide a fair, 
efficient, and equitable distribution of radio service to each of the same. 
47 U.S.C. § 307(b) (2003). 
 182. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 101-04 (explaining that the key issue during 
the television freeze was the choice between local and regional television stations, 
forced by the limited amount of VHF spectrum that was dedicated to television, and 
stating that the Commission made its preference for localism clear when it chose to 
authorize more local stations at lower powers rather than to allow the creation of a 
fourth network that would provide options regionally). 
 183. See id. at 104. 
 184. See id. at 101-03. 
 185. See generally 1982 UHF Development Policy Order, supra note 42 (dedicating 
a task force to study UHF television and make recommendations to the Commission 
as to how to improve this service so that more communities may have their own 
television outlets). 
 186. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,760-61. 
[T]he Commission has licensed stations to serve local communities, 
pursuant to section 307(b) of the 1934 Act, and it has obligated them to 
serve the needs and interests of their communities.  Stations may fulfill this 
obligation by presenting local news and public affairs programming and by 
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this rule has created too much concentration among the largest 
broadcast companies.187  When a network owns the majority of 
commercial television stations in the country, it creates an absentee 
owner situation that runs contrary to the FCC’s vision for television.  
In short, the Commission’s “latter-day Mark Twain” is now sitting on 
the eighty-first floor in midtown Manhattan. 
Another major concern in this arena is the overwhelming power 
that the networks have over local affiliates.  Rules that encourage 
greater network ownership of stations threaten to leave communities 
without local programming or a diversity of voices because large 
networks wield more power in their negotiations over station 
programming.188  Networks naturally prefer to run content that will 
attract the most viewers at the lowest cost to them.189  Such 
programming is network programming, not local programming.190  
The advertising revenue a program earns depends on the size of its 
audience or the number of viewers that the advertiser can reach.191  It 
is far less costly to show Friends or Seinfeld than community shows or 
locally produced-programs.192  Local shows are expensive to create 
                                                          
selecting programming based on the particular needs and interests of the 
station’s community. 
Id. (internal citations omitted).  UHF stations were limited to operating at lower 
power levels in order to maintain their localism.  See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 
103; OWEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 122-23.  Thus, fostering the growth of these local 
outlets is a way to further a doctrine of localism. 
 187. See Miller & Trigoboff, supra note 9 (calculating national ownership for the 
top media companies without the UHF discount).  Without the UHF discount 
provision, Paxson would reach 61.8% of U.S. homes, Viacom 44.8%, Fox 44.4%, 
Univision 41.8%, Tribune 40.1%, and NBC 38.3%.  Id. at 2-3.  The UHF discount 
therefore allows six of the top media markets to operate above the thirty-five percent 
national ownership limits.  Id. 
 188. See Matthew Rose & Joe Flint, Behind Media-Ownership Fight, An Old Power 
Struggle is Raging, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at A1 (reporting on the struggle by 
affiliate station owners against networks who try to force network-preferred television 
lineups on affiliates); 1996 Broadcast Ownership NPRM, supra note 120, ¶ 7 (noting 
a petitioner’s warning “that retaining the UHF discount [allows] developing 
networks, which affiliate primarily with UHF stations, to ‘subvert’ [the national 
ownership restrictions] and actually to reach double the audience of operators with 
mostly VHF stations” and thereby allows networks to gain enough market power to 
pressure a small-station affiliate to show network programming over local 
programming, regardless of that station’s preference); see also UCC et al. Comments, 
supra note 117, at 52 (“[D]iversifying station ownership at the national level helps to 
ensure that local needs and program preferences are met.”). 
 189. See NOLL ET AL., supra note 23, at 60-61 (discussing the economics of network 
programming). 
 190. See id. (“Networks thus acquire, and offer to affiliates, programming more 
appealing than that available from nonnetwork sources . . . .”). 
 191. See id. at 60. 
 192. See id. (“[T]he greater the popularity of network programs the smaller the 
share of revenue required to make them more popular to a station.”); Joe Flint, 
Dearth of Network Sitcoms Hurts Stations Seeking Reruns, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2004, at B1 
(noting that large syndication revenues for popular network programs make these 
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and only bring in a fraction of the advertising revenue that network 
programming attracts.193  Local station owners often run into trouble 
in today’s broadcast market when they choose to run local 
programming to serve the community.  Networks can threaten to cut 
payments to local stations and thereby usurp station decisions.194  
Alarmingly, local stations are often forced to air programming that is 
offensive to community standards instead of local or “family-friendly” 
programming.195  In fact, stations are suffering from these strong-arm 
tactics ever more frequently.196 
Media concentration also stifles ownership and viewpoint diversity.  
Diversity has its roots in the public interest concerns of the Radio Act 
of 1927,197 but was explicitly designated as the primary safeguard of 
the public interest in broadcast by both the Federal Radio 
Commission and the Federal Communications Commission.198  
Diversity also plays a critical role in the advancement of First 
Amendment values by ensuring a broad variety of speech over the 
airwaves.199 
The Commission’s goal of diversity of ownership derives from a 
theory that a variety of owners in broadcast will produce the greatest 
array of viewpoints, as well as prevent an undue concentration of 
                                                          
programs more profitable and relatively less expensive to produce). 
 193. See Flint, supra note 192; UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 52-58 
(arguing that allowing the networks to own more local stations will make these 
stations more likely to broadcast content based on the financial interests of the 
networks, not the preferences of local viewers). 
 194. Networks frequently force local stations to air the shows that networks prefer, 
regardless of the station’s efforts to serve the needs and tastes of their local 
communities.  See Rose & Flint, supra note 188. 
 195. See id. (explaining how networks gain the upper hand against broadcast 
stations through “preemption deals” by forcing them to show the program that 
networks want aired). 
 196. Capital Broadcasting Company is one example of stations fighting back 
against network pressure.  See Rose & Flint, supra note 188 (discussing Capitol 
Broadcasting Company CEO John Goodman’s fight to select programming that he 
feels is in the best interest of his own community over network protests). 
 197. See Radio Act of 1927 § 4, 69 Pub. L. No. 632, 44 Stat. 1162, 1163 (1927) 
(establishing the Federal Radio Commission to allocate frequencies among 
applicants in a manner responsive to the “public interest, convenience, or 
necessity”).  
 198. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (citing the 
Commission’s view in 1929 that the “public interest requires ample play for the free 
and fair competition of opposing views . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); 2002 
Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,756 (contending “[t]he 
diversity of viewpoints, by promoting an informed citizenry, is essential to a well-
functioning democracy”). 
 199. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 18,516 (citing 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) for the proposition that the 
First Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the 
public”). 
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economic power.200  The Supreme Court, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. 
v. FCC, found that the First Amendment’s purpose is “to preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, 
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee.”201 
Different owners are likely to have different political and economic 
interests, and the public benefits from this variety by being better 
informed.202  Those fighting media concentration contend that the 
media’s failure to cover recent corporate scandals, such as those at 
Enron and WorldCom, had much to do with concentration of 
ownership in media corporations because so many of the large media 
companies were concerned with making business deals to merge or 
aquire these very companies.203  The concentration encouraged by 
rules like the UHF discount stifles independent voices and 
compromises community values204 and community needs.205 
                                                          
 200. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,287-
89 (outlining the five types of diversity that comprise a major policy objective in 
broadcast, including viewpoint, outlet, program, source, and minority and female 
ownership diversity). 
 201. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
 202. A recent survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press found 
widespread concern among journalists that certain news stories were being 
manipulated or avoided altogether because of the effects these stories have on the 
interests of media companies.  UCC et al. Comments, supra note 117, at 4 n.13.  
“More than one-third of the respondents said that news that hurt the financial 
interests of the news organization often or sometimes went unreported while 29% 
said that news that adversely affected advertisers often or sometimes went 
unreported.”  Id. 
 203. See id. at 7 n.28 (citing a story that reported that “media companies failed to 
watchdog the finance industry [because] media conglomerates were involved in the 
very same ‘orgy’ of mergers and acquisitions during the late ‘90s”). One 
commentator suggested that “had AOL and the Washington Post had common 
ownership, the Post may never have reported AOL’s improper accounting practices, 
which ultimately ignited an SEC investigation of AOL.”  Id. at 7 (citing Alicia Mundy, 
Media Under Review, CABLE WORLD, Sept. 16, 2002). 
 204. Increasing media concentration, by allowing networks to purchase more 
stations than ever, currently takes the decision-making power from stations and gives 
it to networks.  See Rose & Flint, supra note 188 (reporting that station owners, like 
Jim Goodman of Capital Broadcasting, are pleading with the FCC to reign in the size 
of networks and their ability to overpower affiliates).  Networks’ growth allows them 
not only to reduce the amount they pay to local affiliates to run their programming, 
but in some instances, to actually require the affiliates to pay the networks for 
carrying their shows.  Id.  Networks have also gained the upper hand in preemption 
deals.  They frequently force local stations to air the shows that the networks prefer, 
and that the local stations find offensive to community standards, over local or 
“family-friendly” programming.  Id. 
 205. See Ted Turner, Monopoly or Democracy?, WASH. POST, May 30, 2003, at A23 
(writing about the dangers of media consolidation). 
When you lose small businesses, you lose big ideas.  People who own their 
own businesses are their own bosses.  They are independent thinkers . . . .  
[Large media corporations] kill local programming because it’s expensive, 
and they push national programming because it’s cheap—even if it runs 
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The Commission’s focus on encouraging competition among 
media outlets came explicitly from the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, but has its roots in the principle of viewpoint diversity.206  
Indeed, the Commission has long found that encouraging a wide 
variety of television stations benefits the public interest because a 
competitive environment engenders improved service among 
competitors.207  Healthy competition also ensures various viewpoints 
on television, which helps advance First Amendment values.   
Today, of the 1,248 commercial television stations operating in 
2000, over 1,000 are affiliated with one of the seven largest U.S. 
commercial networks.208  The UHF discount provision allows the 
largest media companies, which have the greatest purchasing power, 
to acquire most of the channels on the air, and thus become large, 
powerful media conglomerates.209  At the same time, the smallest 
media companies and independent owners are being shut out of the 
market by these ever-growing media giants.210  The outcry against the 
Commission’s decision to allow greater broadcast ownership is so 
widespread that leaders of some of the biggest companies were 
compelled to protest it.  Ted Turner, founder of CNN and Chairman 
                                                          
counter to local interests and community values. 
Id. 
 206. See Aarons, supra note 27, at 329-30 (explaining that the 1996 
Telecommunications Act further embraced the spirit of deregulation in media that 
began in the 1980s, and that the Commission’s shift towards deregulation stemmed 
from a desire to encourage the development of new media outlets).  According to 
Aarons, the Commission reasoned that competition would allow consumers to 
choose from a variety of broadcast alternatives, thereby making it unnecessary for the 
government to protect the public interest through regulation.  Id. 
 207. See, e.g., 1980 TV Allotments NPRM, supra note 45, ¶ 10 (“Increasing the 
number of television competitors is likely to (1) put pressure on competitors to be 
more responsive to the wants and needs of consumers; (2) increase the total amount 
of service available to consumers; and (3) increase the diversity of service offered.”). 
 208. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755 (noting 
that “[o]ver sixty percent of commercial TV stations are affiliated with one of the top 
four networks (ABC, CBS, Fox, NBC) . . . [a]nother 19% are affiliated with the 
smaller national networks:  (United Paramount (UPN), Warner Brothers (WB), and 
Paxson Network) . . . [and] [t]he remaining stations are affiliated with other smaller 
networks or are independents.”). 
 209. See Turner, supra note 205 (reporting that the current climate of media 
consolidation forced him to sell Turner Broadcasting to Time Warner, and threatens 
the survival of small companies). 
 210. See id.; see also Martin Peers, How Media Giants are Reassembling the Old 
Oligopoly, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2002, at A1. 
Entertainment giants such as Viacom, NBC parent General Electric Co., and 
Walt Disney Co., which owns ABC, now reach more than 50% of the 
primetime TV audience through their combined broadcast and cable 
outlets.  The total rises to 80% if you include the parents of newer 
networks—such as News Corp.’s Fox and AOL Time Warner Inc.’s WB—and 
NBC’s pending acquisitions of Vivendi Universal’s cable assets. . . . 
Id. 
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of Turner Enterprises, Inc., claims that if the rules approved by the 
Commission had existed in 1970, he could not have established 
Turner Broadcasting or CNN.211  He asserts that all of the UHF 
stations have been bought, and that even an acquisition of an 
available station would not provide an independent owner with the 
opportunity to succeed.212  To compete, Turner states, “you have to 
have good programming and good distribution.  Today both are 
owned by conglomerates that keep the best for themselves and leave 
the worst for you—if they sell anything to you at all.  It is hard to 
compete when your suppliers are owned by your competitors.”213 
In its most recent broadcast review, the Commission chose to 
maintain the UHF discount while voting to raise the ownership cap to 
forty-five percent.214  By so doing, the Commission turned a blind eye 
to the fact that this allows the largest media companies to amass the 
majority of stations on the air.215  The media ownership rules 
advanced by the 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review allow one company 
to own UHF TV stations in 199 of 210 markets currently existing in 
the United States, almost ninety-five percent of U.S. markets, “the 
equivalent of owning stations in every television market in the entire 
country except California.”216  This is even more troubling when one 
considers that maintaining the UHF discount in this new regulatory 
environment enables companies like News Corp’s Fox, Viacom’s UPN 
                                                          
 211. See Turner, supra note 205 (arguing that the FCC rules that extend the 
market dominance of the largest media corporations render it “virtually impossible” 
for an independent owner to enter the television market).  The theory that 
consolidated media ownership eliminates local programming and independent ideas 
underlies Turner’s warning against allowing media concentration.  Id. 
 212. See id. (“If a young media entrepreneur were trying to get started today under 
these proposed rules, he or she wouldn’t be able to buy a UHF station, as I did.  
They’re all bought up.”). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,286, 
46,327-28 (maintaining the UHF discount but raising the national ownership cap 
from thirty-five percent to forty-five percent); see also Zuckerman, supra note 3 
(stating that the FCC’s recent decision will deliver “a body blow to American 
democracy,” because the decision allows large media companies “to buy up more TV 
stations and newspapers, becoming more powerful and reaping a financial 
bonanza”). 
 215. The UHF discount allows a company to own twice as many UHF as VHF 
stations, and there are many more UHF than VHF stations on the air today.  See 2002 
Biennial Broadcast Review NPRM, supra note 24, at 65,755.  Thus, the UHF discount 
has allowed companies to obtain a massive number of UHF stations, without 
exceeding the national ownership cap. 
 216. See Zuckerman, supra note 3 (reporting that, due to the new rules, “a single 
company could influence the elections for 98 U.S. senators, 382 members of the 
House of Representatives, 49 governors, 49 state legislatures, and countless local 
races”). 
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and AOL Time Warner’s WB to reach ninety percent of the 
population.217 
The Commission’s justification for keeping the UHF discount 
intact was that it found this rule necessary to promote entry and 
competition among broadcast networks.218  Paradoxically, because the 
provision effectively raises the national ownership cap, the largest 
media companies are making it impossible for smaller networks to 
enter the field.219  The Commission also argues that without this 
provision, UHF stations will find themselves back in economically 
unfavorable situations without networks to support them.220  However, 
the Commission’s findings show that UHF stations are not having any 
trouble acquiring network affiliation.221 
The Commission’s plan for the UHF discount conceived in the 
2002 Broadcast Review is not logical.  It proposes to put off 
consideration of a sunset provision for the UHF discount until a 
transition to Digital Television is near completion.222  It asserts that 
digital television equalizes UHF and VHF signals by eliminating the 
analog signal altogether.223  However, cable equalizes the UHF and 
VHF signal just as effectively.224  Still, the Commission argues that a 
substantial amount of the American public is not a subscriber of 
cable.225  To the contrary, over eighty-six percent of American 
households receive television over some kind of cable or satellite 
service, and over ninety-seven percent of American households are 
cable-ready.226  It is simply not justifiable to regulate broadcast 
                                                          
 217. See id.; see also Owen Gibson, US Plans Radical Revamp of Media Ownership Rules, 
GUARDIAN, May 13, 2003 (quoting Gene Kimmelman, director of the Consumer’s 
Union, who charges that retaining the UHF discount while raising the national 
ownership cap is “total hypocrisy”), available at  http://media.guardian.co.uk./city/ 
story/0,7497,955024,00.html. 
 218. See 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, 46,340-41 
(claiming that UHF continues to experience a competitive handicap as compared 
with VHF). 
 219. See Turner, supra note 205 (warning that the current level of media 
concentration is crippling competition in the broadcast industry). 
 220. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341. 
 221. See, e.g., 1995 Review of Broadcast Rules Order, supra note 12, ¶¶ 1, 12-26 
(repealing the Secondary Affiliation Rule based on evidence that UHF stations have 
had remarkable success attracting affiliates without the help of this regulation).  In 
fact, the 2003 Broadcast Ownership Rules cite statements from Univision and Paxson 
detailing their success in affiliating with UHF stations.  2002 Biennial Broadcast 
Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341. 
 222. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,341. 
 223. Id. 
 224. 1995 PTAR Order, supra note 14, ¶¶ 73-80 (noting the EI Study’s finding that 
cable has eliminated the UHF signal disadvantage). 
 225. 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Ownership Rules, supra note 4, at 46,340-41. 
 226. See id.; Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the 
Delivery of Video Programming, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,912, 7,912 (Jan. 26, 2001) 
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television based on a public interest that ignores all but three percent 
of the public. 
The Commission must act to eliminate or promptly phase out the 
UHF discount, especially given the increase in the national ownership 
cap promulgated by the 2002 Broadcast Review, and subsequently, 
the Appropriations Act of 2004.  Supporters of the provision could 
argue that eliminating the UHF discount would disrupt the market at 
the expense of owners and consumers because many media entities 
would be forced above the thirty-five percent national ownership cap.  
However, the Commission’s traditional reluctance to force divestiture 
suggests that many current ownership situations would likely be 
“grandfathered” into the new rules.227  Indeed, through a 1989 Notice 
of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC requested comments on whether 
or not to grandfather ownership relationships that would exceed the 
rules in the case of UHF discount elimination.228  One caveat to this 
theory is that, according to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 
2004, broadcast companies that exceed the new thirty-nine percent 
national ownership cap have two years to divest their excess 
interests.229  Thus, the Commission could interpret this language in a 
way that prompts it to enforce divestiture if and when it decides to 
eliminate the UHF discount.  Nonetheless, repealing this provision is 
the only way to ameliorate the effects of gross media concentration in 
the future. 
The most effective solution is to eliminate the UHF discount and 
encourage divestiture, pursuant to a proposal like Senator McCain’s 
Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003.230  
                                                          
(estimating that homes “passed” by cable, or cable-ready, was 97.1% as of June 2001). 
 227. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 786-88, 792 
(1978) (finding that a small gain in diversity was not enough justification for an 
across-the-board divestiture requirement in the cross-ownership restriction rule 
because that level of divestiture would cause disruption for the industry and hardship 
for individual owners).  In the rulemaking that became the subject of this 
proceeding, the Commission held that divestiture was warranted only in the most 
egregious cases of cross-ownership monopoly.  See id. at 787. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-109, § 629, 118 
Stat. 3. 
 230. See Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003, S. 267, 108th 
Cong. § 6(b) (2003).  The Minority Media and Telecommunications Council filed 
Comments in opposition to the 2002 Biennial Broadcast Review Order and a Petition 
for Reconsideration, urging the Commission to adopt the “SDB [socially and 
economically disadvantaged businesses] Transfer Option” set forth in Senator John 
McCain’s proposed Telecommunications Ownership Diversification Act of 2003.  See 
Comments of the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, In the Matter of 
Broadcast Ownership Omnibus Proceeding, MB Docket No. 02-277 (May 27, 2003) 
(on file with the American University Law Review); Petition for Reconsideration of 
the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, In the Matter of 2002 
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According to this plan, broadcast companies exceeding the national 
ownership cap after the UHF discount is eliminated would sell 
“clusters” of stations, intact, to socially and economically 
disadvantaged businesses (“SDB”).  This “SDB Transfer” would 
provide a way to keep the largest media companies under the 
national ownership cap without disrupting the market by forcing 
them to break up station groups.231  The plan would additionally 
benefit minority owners by allowing them to take advantage of the 
efficiencies of a pre-created group of stations in a cluster.  The 
Commission has already made numerous efforts over the past several 
years to encourage this kind of diversity in broadcast ownership.232  
This solution is ideal, as it eliminates some of the most egregious 
broadcast television concentration while maintaining market 
efficiencies.233  Most importantly, by fostering the growth of 
disadvantaged, minority-owned, and female-owned businesses, this 
solution also serves the public interest goals of encouraging greater 
diversity and competition in the media marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
As an agency entrusted to protect the public interest, the 
Commission has a duty to create and enforce rules that truly serve the 
tenets of its public interest mandate.  Without examining market 
                                                          
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and Newspapers, Rules and 
Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio Broadcast Stations in Local 
Markets, Definition of Radio Markets, Definition of Radio Markets for Areas Not 
Located in an Arbitron Survey Area, MB Docket Nos. 02-277, 03-130, MM Docket 
Nos. 01-235, 01-317, 00-244 (Sept. 4, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
Review). 
 231. See Letter from David Honig, Executive Director, Minority Media and 
Telecommunications Council, to Michael Powell, Kathleen Abernathy, Jonathan 
Adelstein, Michael Copps, and Kevin Martin, Commissioners, Federal 
Communications Commission 3 (May 27, 2003) (on file with the American 
University Law Review) (urging the FCC to adopt the SDP Transfer plan). 
 232. See In the Matter of Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum 
Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 6387, ¶ 
5 (1992) (concluding that encouraging investment in small businesses and minority 
broadcasters is a worthy goal).  Chairman Sikes proposed a plan to allow those who 
incubated minority-owned companies to acquire additional stations beyond the 
ownership caps.  Id. ¶ 6; see also 1985 Amended Multiple Ownership Order, supra 
note 9, at ¶¶ 50-53 (expressing hope that the Commission’s national ownership rules 
will also encourage minority ownership). 
 233. S. 267 § 2(a).  Although this bill contemplates that the Treasury Department 
would be responsible for conducting a rulemaking to determine which groups, like 
Hispanics or women, are socially and economically disadvantaged in the 
telecommunications industries, the Commission could also engage in its own case-by-
case determination of eligible small or minority-owned businesses to find the best 
buyers for these clusters.  Id. 
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data, it is easy to believe that the Commission is abiding by these 
mandates and regulating communications consistent with its own 
findings.  By maintaining an outdated provision like the UHF 
discount, especially in the face of an increased national ownership 
cap, the Commission is choosing instead to eviscerate the priciples 
that founded its creation in 1934.  The FCC must give broadcast 
television back to the people.  The best way to do this is to eliminate 
the UHF discount and distribute media interests to a diversity of 
owners.  While the Congress of 1934 could never have envisioned the 
technologies and variety in today’s media, it would wholeheartedly 
support any plan that would ensure that the American public has 
airwaves “of, by, and for the people.”234 
                                                          
 234. Statement of Commissioner Michael Copps, dissenting, Regarding the 2002 
Biennial Regulatory Review—Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership 
Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, at 
23 (June 2, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/ 
DOC-235047A9.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
